zlacker

[parent] [thread] 45 comments
1. nindal+(OP)[view] [source] 2019-10-04 07:08:50
This link and the two answers within demonstrate something important, broader than the DNS related issue at hand.

Both make implicit assumptions. One assumes the worst of Cloudflare and thinks “what’s the worst reason Cloudflare could have for doing this. How do they profit off this?” And the other assumes that Cloudflare has good intentions.

Neither answer is technically wrong. Both flow logically from their initial assumptions. But it shows how different our conclusions can be depending on where our initial biases lie. For the person who believes the first answer and says “prove to me that Cloudflare isn’t doing something nefarious”, it’s not possible. The analysis is correct and can’t be challenged unless the initial assumption is challenged. And for people who strongly believe that Cloudflare has bad intentions, nothing can be done to change their mind.

In this example it’s Cloudflare but it applies to any person or organisation that we feel strongly about.

replies(3): >>chesch+V1 >>nabla9+X3 >>Crinus+Dd
2. chesch+V1[view] [source] 2019-10-04 07:34:53
>>nindal+(OP)
The second one is not an assumption, it's Cloudflare's official position. For a person who is against Cloudflare, I feel like this would only serve to reinforce the confirmation bias as there's seemingly no person except a Cloudflare employee willing to step up and defend the action.

So, yes, good observation.

replies(1): >>nindal+A2
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3. nindal+A2[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 07:44:53
>>chesch+V1
Arguably, no one except a Cloudflare employee could know the reason why they took this decision. A random person speculating “maybe they did this for privacy reasons” doesn’t strike me as better than Cloudflare saying “we did this for privacy reasons”.

And while the second answer is a statement, not an analysis the rest of what I said holds. You will only accept their statement as the truth if you assume good intent of them.

replies(4): >>113+I2 >>yc1234+x3 >>cm2187+G5 >>thrwwa+T6
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4. 113+I2[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 07:47:09
>>nindal+A2
Corporations operate for profit.
replies(2): >>tedk-4+63 >>nindal+h3
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5. tedk-4+63[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 07:52:05
>>113+I2
Indeed - but there are other ways to make money than to sell of your personal information to the highest advertising bidder.
replies(1): >>jgraha+E4
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6. nindal+h3[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 07:53:43
>>113+I2
And so you accept the first answer. That’s fine.

Cloudflare has repeatedly said that while they operate for profit, they take the long term view. By doing the right thing now, by being privacy focussed, they will be profitable for decades to come. This seems logical to me, which makes the second answer more believable.

replies(1): >>nathan+Pe
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7. yc1234+x3[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 07:56:20
>>nindal+A2
Nah, I will assume it as truth only when it makes sense.
replies(1): >>nindal+Kr
8. nabla9+X3[view] [source] 2019-10-04 08:01:55
>>nindal+(OP)
You have to look at Cloudflare user agreement's and texts that describe their relationship to their customers. https://www.cloudflare.com/privacypolicy/ and https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/commitment-to-priv...

You can only held companies accountable for the laws and explicit written promises and legally binding agreements.

Currently the price companies pay for privacy violations is low. If a company like Cloudflare writes down all the privacy promise in legally bind manner and puts themselves into legal and financial liability that is above the norm for breaking the contract intentionally it can increase trust.

Companies can do much more than they do now. They can put explicit bounties for whistle blowing them and revealing privacy violations. They can hire trusted third parties to do privacy audits and handle whistle blowing.

replies(4): >>wilddu+W4 >>pnako+Y4 >>Thorre+P5 >>yourad+CB
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9. jgraha+E4[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 08:11:25
>>tedk-4+63
Such as, in Cloudflare's case, selling our service (the DDoS protection, the caching, the firewalling etc.) to companies that pay for that service because it helps them.

While at the same time working to preserve people's privacy with things like giving out SSL for free, pushing for eSNI, running a public DoH server, building a service that makes sure all data from your phone to us is encrypted etc. etc.

replies(3): >>denton+Q8 >>cnst+gb >>tomp+Dr
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10. wilddu+W4[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 08:15:36
>>nabla9+X3
> They can hire trusted third parties to do privacy audits and handle whistle blowing.

All software seems to need that now days.

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11. pnako+Y4[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 08:15:42
>>nabla9+X3
None of that is legally binding if you don't have a contract with them.
replies(1): >>nabla9+4d
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12. cm2187+G5[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 08:25:04
>>nindal+A2
You are assuming companies make decisions for a single reason.
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13. Thorre+P5[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 08:28:32
>>nabla9+X3
> They can put explicit bounties for whistle blowing them and revealing privacy violations.

Employees blowing the whistle internally, or externally? If they want to encourage employees to blow the whistle externally, they could put a carve out for that in their NDA.

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14. thrwwa+T6[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 08:41:30
>>nindal+A2
>A random person speculating “maybe they did this for privacy reasons” doesn’t strike me as better than Cloudflare saying “we did this for privacy reasons”.

you are saying the accessor function getX() which returns a value of X but you don't trust it, you think it's giving you crap, should not be treated any differently depending on whether the getX() function even has access to X or has absolutely no such access. (For example if the value of x isn't even on the same network partition as the getX() function you don't trust.)

You're saying if you don't trust it, it doesn't matter if the function itself even has access to X or doesn't.

In one sense that might be true, but in another sense that seems silly. If getX itself has access to X, you can try to determine whether it is giving it to you. if getX doesn't have any access to X, then it doesn't really matter what it's doing, its process is irrelevant.

so to me there's a huge material difference. We can try to judge the process by which getX() returned Cloudflare's motivations. What steps did it perform to return that value? What's the code? etc.

huge difference. that knowledge is somewhere in the company.

replies(1): >>krageo+M9
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15. denton+Q8[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 09:12:38
>>jgraha+E4
"like giving out SSL for free"

The market rate for standard SSL certs is zero.

replies(1): >>jgraha+gc
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16. krageo+M9[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 09:27:14
>>thrwwa+T6
To summarise, your position is that what Cloudflare says is more trustworthy because they know the truth.

You do not really address the fact that they are not required to say the truth, or that when the truth is harmful for their public image they are directly incentivised to not speak the truth. The only way you do address this is by saying that this is something that needs investigating. I would posit that the grandparent has done this already, and come to the sensible conclusion: There is less reason to trust someone incentivised to lie than there is to trust someone who knows nothing.

Aside from that trust, we have to evaluate the validity of statements. Given prior knowledge, for Cloudflare in the bad case the likelihood of a valid statement approaches zero. For the random yelling things as they pop into their mind, it is completely unknown.

replies(1): >>thrwwa+Yc
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17. cnst+gb[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 09:49:33
>>jgraha+E4
It's been shown that Cloudflare's DoH service is a lot ado about nothing, and is actually worse for privacy, not better:

* https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21071022

Likewise for 1.1.1.1 — when taking into consideration the local caching appliances that the ISPs have invested in, the lack of ECS would make the clients go all the way through the internet for the same content that's already cached locally by the ISP for users of all other decent resolvers — this will only contribute to increased costs for the individual ISPs, extra latency for users, and more competitive advantage of your products due to you diminishing the technological advantages of your competitors, without regard to the actual user experience of the users, or the reliability and scaling of the internet infrastructure at large.

Not to mention that such Netflix/YouTube usage, when going directly through transit providers and through the whole internet, would also subject the users to a greater chance of surveillance at large compared to users of resolvers that would access local copies on the caching appliance.

replies(2): >>pixl97+ck >>andrea+I91
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18. jgraha+gc[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 10:05:53
>>denton+Q8
It wasn't in 2014 (https://blog.cloudflare.com/introducing-universal-ssl/) when we launched it.
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19. thrwwa+Yc[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 10:18:52
>>krageo+M9
My position is only that there's a difference. In some sense we could treat it as though it's just garbage, but it's worth investigating. For example if it was written by an outside PR person who has no access to the people who made the decision, that also changes things.

It's not so pure. For example an outsider here on HN who says "A close relative of mine works at cloudflare on the team that made this decision, and he confided in me..." -- then again you have to somehow judge if this is true or not, but it is worth treating it differently from someone writing "I don't have any insider information and this is pure speculation, but maybe..."

I mean it just doesn't make sense to treat these cases as exactly the same. I wanted to give another example. say you don't trust the gps coordinates you're being given when you make an API call on a device.

would it make sense to treat it exactly the same as making the API call on a device that doesn't even have a gps module, such as a microcontroller without gps or wifi/cellular access or anything that can be a proxy for gps?

if there's a physical module and you don't trust the output, at least you can investigate. it doesn't make sense to treat it exactly the same as if the information isn't even on the same device.

it depends on the details of the process that's giving you the output you don't trust. What's the process by which getX returns its output? What's the process by which Cloudflare employees make statements about their motivations (which they do have access to)?

These are questions we can investigate. if we find that the statements are written by a PR agency who hasn't even stepped in their building and has no contact with the teams they're lying on behalf of, that's a possible result too. but it's worth looking into.

replies(1): >>krageo+Xv
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20. nabla9+4d[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 10:20:22
>>pnako+Y4
Click-wrap agreement and browse-wrap agreement are both contracts.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browse_wrap

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clickwrap

replies(1): >>cobbzi+ne
21. Crinus+Dd[view] [source] 2019-10-04 10:26:07
>>nindal+(OP)
This response reminds me of this meme:

https://randysrandom.com/wp-content/uploads/right-wrong.jpg

Neither answer may look technically wrong, but only one reflects what is actually happening here. That we don't know which exactly based on that specific data doesn't mean that both are equally valid.

replies(2): >>nindal+7m >>robins+zK
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22. cobbzi+ne[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 10:35:06
>>nabla9+4d
But you must actually “click” or “browse” for it to be enforceable, right?
replies(2): >>nabla9+sN >>zaarn+El2
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23. nathan+Pe[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 10:40:47
>>nindal+h3
Do you remember "do no evil"?

Pepperidge Farms remembers.

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24. pixl97+ck[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 12:04:26
>>cnst+gb
Except in the US the ISPs are some of the biggest surveillance organizations themselves. They are also highly monopolized so most people in the US are on one of a very small number of ISPs
replies(1): >>zrm+NI
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25. nindal+7m[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 12:20:10
>>Crinus+Dd
Yes and if we really really cared about this, we’d launch an investigation. But we don’t care that much. We just want to scroll this thread a bit, come to a conclusion about Cloudflare and move on to the next HN thread. Given that we’re going to spend only a couple of minutes on this, it’s easy to figure out which answer we’re going to agree with - the one that confirms our previous belief about Cloudflare.
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26. tomp+Dr[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 13:02:15
>>jgraha+E4
If you're trying to preserve people's privacy, why doesn't the 1.1.1.1 VPN service also mask originating IP?
replies(1): >>jgraha+Su
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27. nindal+Kr[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 13:02:55
>>yc1234+x3
And whether it makes sense depends on your initial bias. Make sense?
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28. jgraha+Su[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 13:25:07
>>tomp+Dr
Warp isn't trying to "hide your IP from the sites you are visiting". It's there to help prevent intermediaries from observing your traffic. A huge percentage of the web is still unencrypted HTTP.

And Warp+ aims to be about that plus performance.

If you want to be totally anonymous on the Internet then I recommend you use Tor. If you just use a VPN then you may hide your IP address from sites you visit but there are tons of other fingerprinting techniques that can be used.

replies(1): >>tomp+Pz
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29. krageo+Xv[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 13:32:13
>>thrwwa+Yc
Your GPS/Microcontroller example is not very relevant, as those are chips that malfunction in measurable ways. We were discussing people. Fundamentally I think we just disagree about how much the word of a corporation can (and should) be trusted. That's okay, and to my view unlikely to change with extended discussion.
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30. tomp+Pz[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 13:54:46
>>jgraha+Su
I understand all that, and you didn't answer my question. Why do you push the narrative that 1.1.1.1 DNS resolver protects user privacy (by hiding originating IP / subnet) whereas 1.1.1.1 VPN gladly reveals that data? In both cases, the destination is hidden to any eavesdroppers, but in the latter case (VPN) the source IP is visible to the destination website, whereas you keep insisting how vital it is to hide source IP in the former case (DNS).
replies(1): >>jgraha+zC
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31. yourad+CB[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 14:05:54
>>nabla9+X3
> And we wanted to put our money where our mouth was, so we committed to retaining KPMG, the well-respected auditing firm, to audit our practices annually and publish a public report confirming we're doing what we said we would.

Looks like they are. https://blog.cloudflare.com/announcing-1111/

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32. jgraha+zC[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 14:10:58
>>tomp+Pz
In the case of Warp, we add the connecting IP information as a header to the HTTP request for sites on Cloudflare. This will typically be inside TLS to the origin server, and so the source IP information will be encrypted and only visible to the web site being visited.

In the case of DNS information about the subnet, the query etc. is sent around unencrypted.

One is open to eavesdropping, the other is not.

replies(3): >>zzzcpa+UD >>tomp+nM >>im3w1l+ct1
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33. zzzcpa+UD[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 14:18:37
>>jgraha+zC
Someone capable of eavesdropping on that query sure as hell capable of eavesdropping on incoming connections to 1.1.1.1 where they can see actual IP address that initiated the query. There is no way to justify this as a privacy feature. Well, unless people don't understand enough to believe you.
replies(1): >>jgraha+iF
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34. jgraha+iF[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 14:27:38
>>zzzcpa+UD
Not really. An eavesdropper can sit in front of the authoritative server for a site and eavesdrop on all the DNS queries with EDNS information. That's one place they need to be.

To eavesdrop on Warp you'd need to do it all over the world, capture encrypted traffic and then try to correlate traffic. If your threat model is a global adversary capable of doing that correlation and you don't want sites to know your IP, then use Tor.

replies(1): >>zzzcpa+mG
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35. zzzcpa+mG[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 14:33:51
>>jgraha+iF
> An eavesdropper can sit in front of the authoritative server for a site and eavesdrop on all the DNS queries with EDNS information.

No, they can sit near your 1.1.1.1 servers and catch all incoming and outgoing traffic, watching connections to your 1.1.1.1 servers that initiate DNS queries and actual outgoing queries that 1.1.1.1 makes to authoritative servers and responses too.

replies(1): >>jgraha+HH
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36. jgraha+HH[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 14:41:38
>>zzzcpa+mG
So if we're talking just about unencrypted DNS to 1.1.1.1 then you're assuming an entity capable of sitting in front of us in 194 cities worldwide.

vs

With EDNS sitting in front of the authoritative server of the site this actor is trying to monitor.

The latter is easier than the former.

replies(1): >>zzzcpa+mI
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37. zzzcpa+mI[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 14:45:27
>>jgraha+HH
In the latter case it's just as easy to catch real IP addresses by sitting in front of authoritative DNS servers and actual servers those DNS records point to. As I said, you just can't justify it as a privacy feature. It does nothing significant in any threat model.
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38. zrm+NI[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 14:49:26
>>pixl97+ck
Which is a good argument for not using your ISP's DNS either, but those are not the only two options.

One of the better alternatives is to get a VPN you trust that puts multiple users behind the same IP address and then operate your own recursive DNS from behind there. The VPN service itself could still log your queries, but at least they have plenty of competitors, and you chose one you trust, right? Or if you don't want to trust any one party, use Tor.

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39. robins+zK[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 15:00:59
>>Crinus+Dd
That meme’s sort of funny in a meta way because presumably the person who actually drew the number (the comic artist) drew it as both a 9 and a 6, so in that one particular case they actually are both right.

The sentiment of the red message is great though.

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40. tomp+nM[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 15:14:05
>>jgraha+zC
Ok, that makes more sense. So you're basically worried about the unencrypted connection between Clouflare and DNS authority server. Initially I understood that you're worried about leaking IPs to DNS authority server itself.
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41. nabla9+sN[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 15:21:09
>>cobbzi+ne
Not necessarily. There can be implied consent.

Of course, in that case you can't put surprising terms into the agreement if they are disadvantageous to the user. Courts don't see that a meeting of the minds took place. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meeting_of_the_minds

replies(1): >>cobbzi+MX
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42. cobbzi+MX[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 16:21:02
>>nabla9+sN
Sure, if you’re actually visiting the site. But (at least in the US) didn’t the recent LinkedIn case find that if my scraper pulls public data off your site, the TOS doesn’t apply?

This court decision doesn’t mean “no rules for scrapers”, rather it means “different rules for scrapers, independent of any site-specific TOS”. Or did I misunderstand the decision?

replies(1): >>nabla9+KZ
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43. nabla9+KZ[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 16:33:41
>>cobbzi+MX
Consumer law applies for consumer users and has different protections than other users have.

Web scraper as a consumer use is hard to argue.

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44. andrea+I91[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 17:31:55
>>cnst+gb
It has been argued, I wouldn't say that it has been shown. Both my ISPs operate a DNS blacklist. So did my previous ISPs, in the country I previously lived in. And in a third country, where I was on holiday. ISPs even in the USA are gnashing their teeth at the prospect of losing visibility into DNS. Why would they care if they weren't using that data? Why do they need a subscriber -> [domain] mapping? Routing tables don't care about domain names. Edge caching of web content doesn't work with https. I might care about DNS caching if the ISPs haven't demonstrated time and again that they will abuse my privacy for a buck, after I've already paid them for the privilege.

I trust Cloudflare much more than I trust any ISP I've had to deal with, including American ISPs when I lived there. I trust Google much more than any ISP, and I'm not particularly charitable towards Google.

Centralized DoH isn't perfect, but it's better than the status quo. The SNI hole is shrinking. My threat model does not include defending against the Mossad doing Mossad things with my email^H^H^H^H^HDNS[1].

[1] https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf

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45. im3w1l+ct1[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 19:36:06
>>jgraha+zC
On twitter[0], they claimed the main thing they were after is a very rough geolocation with the dns request. Country level, or at least continent level. So they can respond with a nearby data center.

That doesn't sound too bad, privacy-wise.

EDIT: I mean if you were to map all US IP's to a single canonical IP for instance.

[0] https://twitter.com/archiveis/status/1018691421182791680

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46. zaarn+El2[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-05 09:04:41
>>cobbzi+ne
It would be a lot harder for Cloudflare to argue some clause in the contract is non-binding when they provided the contract in the first place than the consumer on the other end who just clicked "OK" on a button to agree to that contract.
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