zlacker

Someone capable of eavesdropping on that query sure as hell capable of eavesdropping on incoming connections to 1.1.1.1 where they can see actual IP address that initiated the query. There is no way to justify this as a privacy feature. Well, unless people don't understand enough to believe you.

>>zzzcpa+(OP)
Not really. An eavesdropper can sit in front of the authoritative server for a site and eavesdrop on all the DNS queries with EDNS information. That's one place they need to be.

To eavesdrop on Warp you'd need to do it all over the world, capture encrypted traffic and then try to correlate traffic. If your threat model is a global adversary capable of doing that correlation and you don't want sites to know your IP, then use Tor.

>>jgraha+o1
> An eavesdropper can sit in front of the authoritative server for a site and eavesdrop on all the DNS queries with EDNS information.

No, they can sit near your 1.1.1.1 servers and catch all incoming and outgoing traffic, watching connections to your 1.1.1.1 servers that initiate DNS queries and actual outgoing queries that 1.1.1.1 makes to authoritative servers and responses too.

>>zzzcpa+s2
So if we're talking just about unencrypted DNS to 1.1.1.1 then you're assuming an entity capable of sitting in front of us in 194 cities worldwide.

vs

With EDNS sitting in front of the authoritative server of the site this actor is trying to monitor.

The latter is easier than the former.

>>jgraha+N3
In the latter case it's just as easy to catch real IP addresses by sitting in front of authoritative DNS servers and actual servers those DNS records point to. As I said, you just can't justify it as a privacy feature. It does nothing significant in any threat model.