If you rent a locker, and the terms of the rental agreement say that the person you're renting from has access to the locker for any reason, then the cops do not need a warrant to ask the lessor to open the locker, only a warrant to coerce the lessor to open the locker.
If the lessor is willing to let anybody take a picture of what is in the locker for $5, then the government doing so isn't abusing its special privilege.
In practice, most people do not understand the ramifications of the things they agreed to that put this data out there (if they even read it!) and in many cases did not have reasonable alternatives to the services that they signed up for.
At the same time: I sympathize with LE and intelligence service operators that have their heart in the right place and that would just like to be able to do their jobs in a hostile and hard to navigate digital environment. Tech moves so much faster than they can keep up with.
That's why information in government hands can be more dangerous than in corporate. A good example is when Nazis occupied Holland they used governmental data on religion (collected to properly allocate funds for places of worship) to track jews and send them to the camps.
So data in corporate hands is bad, but governmental data can be even worse.
Having data on everyone and then only using it against people they want to use it against is exactly what the Stasi did. Obviously this is their dream come true --just a little to late for them.
The typical powerful west European countries are corrupt to the core and when people feel we are better off than in the US (self congratulatory posts are common) it's generally lack of political awareness and involvement more than anything.
Freedom of movement, association, speech, religion, bodily autonomy and more... All down the drain.
All you need is a bit of collision between government media and tech and you're golden.
That's spot on, and your analogy is a good one, except that in the realm of personal information, no warrant is required in the US.
There is quite a bit of law and numerous court decisions around this process in the US.
That jurisprudence is more generally called the Third-Party Doctrine[0]:
The third-party doctrine is a United States legal doctrine that holds that
people who voluntarily give information to third parties—such as banks, phone
companies, internet service providers (ISPs), and e-mail servers—have "no
reasonable expectation of privacy" in that information. A lack of privacy
protection allows the United States government to obtain information from
third parties without a legal warrant and without otherwise complying with
the Fourth Amendment prohibition against search and seizure without probable
cause and a judicial search warrant.[1]
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third-party_doctrineEdit: To clarify, I disagree with this doctrine and would love to see limitations on data retention periods as well as warrant requirements for access to such data.
True, but it's even worse than that. Many of those who do understand it, simply don't care ("nothing to hide", "nothing to fear", etc.).
The allure of a "free" service that everyone else uses is enough to abandon any expectation of privacy, and consciously come up with arguments that it doesn't matter.
Going further, it must be clarified that the whole point of doing things this way is that people do not understand it. The people who want to surveil everyone could either do it illegally and get in trouble, or create an inscrutable bureaucratic system that so sufficiently obscures what they are doing that they get the same results along with a legal cover if they are discovered. If we did have privacy laws that prevented this, they would just collect it illegally. This is absolutely not to say that privacy laws are pointless (they would be helpful) but that we must understand this situation not as an accident, but as the slow creation of a class of people who want to exercise power over us and have been getting their way.
U.S. v. Miller [1], which established the third-party doctrine, turned on whether "the business records of the banks" to which the defendant could "assert neither ownership nor possession" could be accessed by subpoena versus court-authorized warrant. (The context turns on bank records. Smith v. Maryland [2] expands it to "phone numbers [conveyed] to the telephone company.")
This seems trivially fixable with legislation. Requests made by the government to third parties in respect of specific persons' non-public (even if not strictly confidential) records require court approval or the first party's consent. Also, easier than trying to expand he definition of "houses, papers, and effects" [3] to cover our data in various clouds: defining, in statute, that there is a legitimate and reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers one dials to speak to or message with another person or persons, e-mails one sends to a small group of people, handles one provides a messaging service marketed as encrypted, and articles (e.g. documents, photos and work products) uploaded to a third party's server for personal use.
[1] https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep...
[2] https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep...
[3] https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-4/
Law says don't collect the data through surveillance. Law doesn't say "don't buy it from people selling it willingly" - probably nobody anticipated that, because... it sounds kinda stupid if you don't know how we got here... yet here we are.
So instead of trying to lawyerball it to make courts declare that it somehow falls under current restrictions, based on intent vs the actual words, we just need to update the damn laws.
Let me tell you what companies can do: they can make lists and pass it privately around to deny you gainful employment, loans, investment, etc. They can also sell it to the government, subverting privacy and due process rights.
If you are hiding information that would cause people not to do business with you that is almost fraud.
That's what privacy is missing. But get the right ad agencies on it to put together some good scare campaigns and maybe.
Gmail launched in 2004.
The Patriot act was signed in to law in October 2001.
Bill Binney blew the whistle on illegal NSA mass data collection of email, web browsing, and cell phone records in 2002.
Hard to pinpoint when smartphones became mainstream, though as a point of reference the iPhone was launched in 2007.
So clearly the NSA was trying to do dragnet surveillance of the internet well before gmail or the widespread use of smartphones.
A quote from the Bill Binney wikipedia page: "Binney has also been publicly critical of the NSA for spying on U.S. citizens, saying of its expanded surveillance after the September 11, 2001 attacks that 'it's better than anything that the KGB, the Stasi, or the Gestapo and SS ever had'"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gmail
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriot_Act
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Binney_(intelligence_o...
But in all seriousness, you should know it is actually possible to use data towards good aims. Policy makers can use data to produce better answers to questions exploring issues like poverty, disease, crime, financial literacy, etc. Setting up a massive survey is slow and extremely expensive, and that makes it extremely hard to iterate on findings. Getting answers years quicker makes it possible for the government to develop better policies, and that's a good thing. Sure the Nazis were evil, and information enabled the Nazis to be more efficient and effective at implementing evil policies. But an un/less-informed government isn't a goal to strive for. Good government implementing good policies is a goal worth striving for, as there are some problems that can only be addressed at government scale.
Considering I know what kind of data is available, I sincerely doubt this is what is happening. Does that mean, that it's all super evil bad bad stuff, nah, but it is exploitable for evil for sure.
In highly competitive markets people use stupid things to deny people opportunities.
In this site there's a trend to treat Europe as a monolithic entity and pretend it's awesome. Any criticism gets taken as "Americuns" being ignorant and europe is awesome.
In reality, I see a lot of unwillingness to accept the political reality and pretend "we are better than USA" via political apathy and coping.
People react negatively when you point out polítical facts they don't want to see. It's easier to look at USA with an air of superiority. This also happens the other way around, of course, but HN demographics make one more typical.
Absent this, one of three conditions exist:
1. There is no monopoly. In which case violence is widespread, and there is no state.
2. There is no legitimacy. In which case violence is capricious.
3. Some non-state power or agent assumes the monopoly on legitimate violence. In which case it becomes, by definition The State.
The state's claim is to legitimacy. A capricious exercise would be an abrogation of legitimacy
Weber, Max (1978). Roth, Guenther; Wittich, Claus (eds.). Economy and Society. Berkeley: U. California Press. p. 54.
<https://archive.org/details/economysociety00webe/page/54/mod...>
There's an excellent explanation of the common misunderstanding in this episode of the Talking Politics podcast: <https://play.acast.com/s/history-of-ideas/weberonleadership>
The misleading and abbreviated form that's frequently found online seems to have originated with Rothbard in the 1960s, and was further popularised by Nozick in the 1970s. It's now falsely accepted as a truth when in fact it is a gross misrepresentation and obscures the core principles Weber advanced.
In your comment, what you confuse is capacity for violence (inherent in all actors, state, individual, corporate, or non-governmental institutional, with numerous extant examples of each) with the Weberian definition of a monopoly on the legitimate claim to violence. In practice, enacting violence on virtually any actor will engender some counterveiling response, though the effectiveness will vary greatly depending on the comparative power and/or disinhibition of the entity responding.
There are numerous examples of private corporations or non-governmental actors engaging in violence, with or without state support or sanction. There are the 100 million souls lost, respectively, to the British East India Company's occupation and administration (as a private entity, with military powers) of India, of the transatlantic slave trade by numerous private commercial operators, and of the genocide against the indigenous populations of the Americas, again much by privately-chartered corporations (as the original British colonies were). There are extant mercenary forces such as Constellis (formerly Academi, formerly Xe, formerly Blackwater) in the US, or the Wagner Group presently transacting genocide in Ukraine. There are oil companies who have initiated coups, paramilitary actions, and assassinations throughout the world. There is the Pinkerton Agency, still extant, and with a storied role in violence against labour and civil rights movements. There are railroads, with their own (private) police forces, which are in fact registered as law enforcement despite being nongovernmental.
The truth is that there is no clean distinction between State and Private use of force, lethal or otherwise. What there is in government is, one hopes, legitimacy and accountability to the citizenry rather than to creditors and investors.