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Why does 1.1.1.1 not resolve archive.is?

submitted by stargr+(OP) on 2019-10-04 05:33:23 | 313 points 157 comments
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3. amarsh+c3[view] [source] 2019-10-04 06:16:03
>>stargr+(OP)
Previous discussion concerning this, which includes replies from Cloudflare: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19828317
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12. vavrus+n4[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 06:32:28
>>cnst+53
Disclaimer: I work on 1.1.1.1. You might not consider your /24 as personally identifying, but others might. The original RFC discusses these problems fairly well (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7871, Privacy notice and privacy considerations). Frank Denis also wrote a good summary on ECS (https://00f.net/2013/08/07/edns-client-subnet/). There's a multitude of ways to fix this - use a whitelist of nameservers to send ECS to to avoid spraying the source prefix everywhere, encrypt the whitelisted connections, or aggregate the source prefix into a largest covering server scope (e.g. if the client is in /24 but nameserver serves the same answer for /16, then using any address in the /16 would do). We're evaluating all of them as there's different trade-offs (see https://blog.mozilla.org/futurereleases/2019/04/02/dns-over-...).
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15. miyuru+e5[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 06:42:20
>>virapt+F3
They are taking about Geo load balancing via DNS.[1]

Just try one of the akamai endpoints to test it. (E.g media.steampowered.com)

For me 1.1.1.1 serves akamai singapore IPs, while 8.8.8.8 serves IPs of my ISPs akamai cache in Sri Lanka.

If your ISP has a bad route to 1.1.1.1, this just gets worse.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GeoDNS

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21. cnst+p6[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 07:02:11
>>profmo+F4
Per https://serverfault.com/a/560059/110020, Google's 8.8.8.8 has had support for `edns0-client-subnet` since at least 2013, so, even if it's only been standardised in 2016, it's been a de-factor standard for quite a while, especially in the internet-technology-years.

Here's an interesting thought — if it's so bad for privacy and isn't necessary for a CDN, does Cloudflare the CDN simply disregard ECS when receiving requests from DNS.Google, or do they take it into account?

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23. rumana+w6[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 07:04:41
>>profmo+p5
> there's wisdom in Postel's law.

For the lazy like me: robustness principle, aka Postel's law

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robustness_principle

Thank you for the reference. I learned something today!

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27. profmo+87[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 07:11:52
>>cnst+p6
> even if it's only been standardised in 2016, it's been a de-factor standard for quite a while, especially in the internet-technology-years.

If archive.is thinks that Internet standards should be adopted so quickly, it's weird that they don't support IPv6 considering it's been a standard since 1998!

Obviously I'm kidding, but only kind of. When it comes to insisting on adopting new standards, edns-client-subnet is a weird hill to die on, especially considering it was always meant to be optional.

> does Cloudflare the CDN simply disregard ECS when receiving requests from DNS.Google, or do they take it into account?

I don't think they have a reason to use it because they use TCP anycast. Looking at https://cachecheck.opendns.com/ they seem to return the same IPs regardless of geography.

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33. cmroan+38[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 07:26:43
>>rumana+w6
Thanks for the link, for which there's the counter-argument, "The Harmful Consequences of the Robustness Principle" [0]:

> A flaw can become entrenched as a de facto standard. Any implementation of the protocol is required to replicate the aberrant behavior, or it is not interoperable. This is both a consequence of applying Postel's advice, and a product of a natural reluctance to avoid fatal error conditions.

[0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-iab-protocol-maintenance-0...

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49. nabla9+Ha[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 08:01:55
>>nindal+K6
You have to look at Cloudflare user agreement's and texts that describe their relationship to their customers. https://www.cloudflare.com/privacypolicy/ and https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/commitment-to-priv...

You can only held companies accountable for the laws and explicit written promises and legally binding agreements.

Currently the price companies pay for privacy violations is low. If a company like Cloudflare writes down all the privacy promise in legally bind manner and puts themselves into legal and financial liability that is above the norm for breaking the contract intentionally it can increase trust.

Companies can do much more than they do now. They can put explicit bounties for whistle blowing them and revealing privacy violations. They can hire trusted third parties to do privacy audits and handle whistle blowing.

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71. vavrus+gg[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 09:22:47
>>majews+cd
This is not the privacy concern, check out the https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7871#section-11.1 discussing it. Yes, if you open a connection to the target IP, then all transit networks between client and the target IP (including the target itself) know who is talking. These are on-path parties. The main (privacy) issue with ECS is not this, but that it shares client's subnet with potentially every nameserver on the referral path (including transit networks between the recursive and nameserver), for every name client looks up (even when it might not support ECS). The client is also not in control of the prefix length. /24 for IPv4 is a recommended default, but the recursive may use however much it wants and there's no way to prove to the client that it didn't. Opt-out is also difficult (afaik only getdns and Firefox clients support an opt-out).
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78. cnst+0i[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 09:49:33
>>jgraha+ob
It's been shown that Cloudflare's DoH service is a lot ado about nothing, and is actually worse for privacy, not better:

* https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21071022

Likewise for 1.1.1.1 — when taking into consideration the local caching appliances that the ISPs have invested in, the lack of ECS would make the clients go all the way through the internet for the same content that's already cached locally by the ISP for users of all other decent resolvers — this will only contribute to increased costs for the individual ISPs, extra latency for users, and more competitive advantage of your products due to you diminishing the technological advantages of your competitors, without regard to the actual user experience of the users, or the reliability and scaling of the internet infrastructure at large.

Not to mention that such Netflix/YouTube usage, when going directly through transit providers and through the whole internet, would also subject the users to a greater chance of surveillance at large compared to users of resolvers that would access local copies on the caching appliance.

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80. jgraha+0j[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 10:05:53
>>denton+Af
It wasn't in 2014 (https://blog.cloudflare.com/introducing-universal-ssl/) when we launched it.
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85. nabla9+Oj[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 10:20:22
>>pnako+Ib
Click-wrap agreement and browse-wrap agreement are both contracts.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browse_wrap

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clickwrap

86. PeterS+lk[view] [source] 2019-10-04 10:26:01
>>stargr+(OP)
Not sure why this is a link to stackexchange as the second answer is lifted from the previous HN discussion on the topic

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19828317

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87. Crinus+nk[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 10:26:07
>>nindal+K6
This response reminds me of this meme:

https://randysrandom.com/wp-content/uploads/right-wrong.jpg

Neither answer may look technically wrong, but only one reflects what is actually happening here. That we don't know which exactly based on that specific data doesn't mean that both are equally valid.

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93. akvadr+Om[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 10:59:24
>>profmo+p5
EDNS is from 1999

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2671

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99. throw0+jr[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 12:06:47
>>profmo+p5
Another interpretation of the Law by Mark Crispin, father of IMAP:

  This statement is based upon a terrible misunderstand of Postel's
  robustness principle. I knew Jon Postel. He was quite unhappy with
  how his robustness principle was abused to cover up non-compliant
  behavior, and to criticize compliant software.

  Jon's principle could perhaps be more accurately stated as "in general,
  only a subset of a protocol is actually used in real life. So, you should
  be conservative and only generate that subset. However, you should also
  be liberal and accept everything that the protocol permits, even if it
  appears that nobody will ever use it."
* https://groups.google.com/d/msg/comp.mail.pine/E5ojND1L4u8/i...

Further discussion on the topic:

* https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9824638

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103. jlokie+tt[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 12:23:52
>>nobody+vq
From https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21155852

> Archive.is does not block all requests lacking EDNS. They specifically block requests coming from Cloudflare's datacenters.

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111. tomp+Vy[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 13:06:45
>>jchw+64
You could also in theory use the originating IP of the DNS requests themselves. But Cloudfare messes up that as well:

https://twitter.com/archiveis/status/1018691421182791680

> Absence of EDNS and massive mismatch (not only on AS/Country, but even on the continent level) of where DNS and related HTTP requests come from causes so many troubles so I consider EDNS-less requests from Cloudflare as invalid.

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112. Godel_+Rz[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 13:14:19
>>doogli+xp
https://mobile.twitter.com/archiveis/status/1018691421182791...
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122. yourad+mI[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 14:05:54
>>nabla9+Ha
> And we wanted to put our money where our mouth was, so we committed to retaining KPMG, the well-respected auditing firm, to audit our practices annually and publish a public report confirming we're doing what we said we would.

Looks like they are. https://blog.cloudflare.com/announcing-1111/

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138. nabla9+cU[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 15:21:09
>>cobbzi+7l
Not necessarily. There can be implied consent.

Of course, in that case you can't put surprising terms into the agreement if they are disadvantageous to the user. Courts don't see that a meeting of the minds took place. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meeting_of_the_minds

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149. im3w1l+Wz1[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-04 19:36:06
>>jgraha+jJ
On twitter[0], they claimed the main thing they were after is a very rough geolocation with the dns request. Country level, or at least continent level. So they can respond with a nearby data center.

That doesn't sound too bad, privacy-wise.

EDIT: I mean if you were to map all US IP's to a single canonical IP for instance.

[0] https://twitter.com/archiveis/status/1018691421182791680

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154. Thorre+G92[view] [source] [discussion] 2019-10-05 01:55:40
>>doogli+xp
Sources for archive.is blocking Cloudflare's datacenters:

The exact same command fails when sent from Cloudflare's datacenters, but succeeds when sent from DigitalOcean:

https://community.cloudflare.com/t/archive-is-error-1001/182...

Two more sources:

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19830258

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19829036

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