what about makerdao makes it reliant on dao goodwill? the incentive to restore the peg is the expectation of profits from liquidating the overextended.
I didn't said that. Once they're listed on "exchanges" or traded on DEX, their price isn't under control of the protocol, and in theory can be anything.
>they promise to be able to repeg in times of severe distress. even some money markets broke the dollar. they had to be bailed out by the government.
MMFs are funds with the NAV which supposed to be around $1.00 (that in addition to earning an interest). In case the NAV goes under $0.95, the fund has to be liquidated. See "Breaking the Buck":
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/breaking-the-buck.asp
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/08/money-ma...
>what about makerdao makes it reliant on dao goodwill? the incentive to restore the peg is the expectation of profits from liquidating the overextended.
Why people kept locking ETH in MakerDAO CDPs over and over during the "crypto" bear market, when ETH was in the free fall? It doesn't make sense from the economic PoV. It only makes sense if your ETH is cheap and you want to prove that MakerDAO works.
Different agents optimize for different things. Some (most?) optimize for size of their wallet/bank account, others want to save their project/ecosystem. Both types are rational.
from your link:
> In 2008 however, the day after Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. filed for bankruptcy, one money market fund fell to 97 cents after writing off the debt it owned that was issued by Lehman. This created the potential for a bank run in money markets [...] the next day the United States Treasury announced a program to insure the holdings of publicly offered money market funds so that should a covered fund break the buck, investors would be protected to $1 NAV
if the US Treasury insured $ust, luna would have been fine
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> Why people kept locking ETH in MakerDAO CDPs over and over during the "crypto" bear market, when ETH was in the free fall?
they're long eth. it's not altruistic, it's incentive alignment.
If you lock your ETH into a CDP - you believe that ETH will not go down. You can also take the DAI from one CDP, exchange it to ETH, and then re-invest it into another (or the same?) CDP - thus creating a synthetic leveraged ETH long position. This can be repeated multiple times;)
My point was that people continued locking ETH into CDPs during the 2018's 90% fall in ETH prices, which only made sense if they had cheap ETH (i.e. insiders/OGs), and their goal was to prevent DAI from de-pegging.
MakerDAO's CDP doesn't seems to be the best instrument for making a LONG bet on ETH. You can just hold ETH, or you can buy ETH futures on Bitmex if you want leverage.
The problem with many algorithmic "stablecoin" designs is the assumption that there always will be speculators willing to take the risk in exchange of betting that peg will be restored. But unlike the designated market makers in some regulated markets, crypto speculators are not contractually obligated to take the risk.
Users need to monitor their open CDPs and add collateral if they are at risk. This has been done to protect users from paying the liquidation penalty fee, which is ~ 13%.
Also, do you really need leverage if your ETH's cost basis is 0 to 30c at the time when market price was in the range of $141 to $816 range?
It's all rounding error to you, you can basically print DAI out of thin air.