https://www.investor.gov/protect-your-investments/fraud/type...
2. Algorithmic "stablecoins" don't work, in the same way as perpetuum mobile doesn't work. You think you're inventing a perpetuum mobile, but you're building a Rube Goldberg's machine instead ;)
3. Every algorithmic "stablecoin" can be traced to 2 papers published in 2014: Hayek Money and Robert Sams' Seigniorage Shares
the industry keeps chasing undercollateralized algo stablecoins because of capital efficiency. jon wu explains to laura shin, worth a watch: https://twitter.com/laurashin/status/1525505300219961344
DAI/MakerDAO isn't an algorithmic "stablecoin", it's an unregistered SEF (Swap Execution Facility) which should be regulated by the CFTC in the US, and similar agencies in other parts of the world.
The only reason DAI didn't broke the USD peg during the "crypto" bear market, is because OG's cost base of ETH was zero to 30 cents, and their objective was to save MakerDAO, rather than make a profit on their CDPs.
> the industry keeps chasing undercollateralized algo stablecoins because of capital efficiency.
Isn't it obvious? ;)
The energy industry also chased perpetuum mobile because of the fuel efficiency, so what?
IMO there are ways to design a capital-efficient low-volatility digital assets (not algorithmic "stablecoins" per say - they're impossible), but they will most-likely be illegal in any developed country, as they will be an exotic derivative instruments.
From the JTBD PoV, the job of the "stablecoins" is to hedge your exposure to the volatile "crypto" assets. The only way to do this is either to exchange them to a less volatile assets, or to enter into a contract with somebody else willing to take the risk in exchange for something.
what about makerdao makes it reliant on dao goodwill? the incentive to restore the peg is the expectation of profits from liquidating the overextended.
I didn't said that. Once they're listed on "exchanges" or traded on DEX, their price isn't under control of the protocol, and in theory can be anything.
>they promise to be able to repeg in times of severe distress. even some money markets broke the dollar. they had to be bailed out by the government.
MMFs are funds with the NAV which supposed to be around $1.00 (that in addition to earning an interest). In case the NAV goes under $0.95, the fund has to be liquidated. See "Breaking the Buck":
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/breaking-the-buck.asp
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/08/money-ma...
>what about makerdao makes it reliant on dao goodwill? the incentive to restore the peg is the expectation of profits from liquidating the overextended.
Why people kept locking ETH in MakerDAO CDPs over and over during the "crypto" bear market, when ETH was in the free fall? It doesn't make sense from the economic PoV. It only makes sense if your ETH is cheap and you want to prove that MakerDAO works.
Different agents optimize for different things. Some (most?) optimize for size of their wallet/bank account, others want to save their project/ecosystem. Both types are rational.
If you lock your ETH into a CDP - you believe that ETH will not go down. You can also take the DAI from one CDP, exchange it to ETH, and then re-invest it into another (or the same?) CDP - thus creating a synthetic leveraged ETH long position. This can be repeated multiple times;)
My point was that people continued locking ETH into CDPs during the 2018's 90% fall in ETH prices, which only made sense if they had cheap ETH (i.e. insiders/OGs), and their goal was to prevent DAI from de-pegging.
MakerDAO's CDP doesn't seems to be the best instrument for making a LONG bet on ETH. You can just hold ETH, or you can buy ETH futures on Bitmex if you want leverage.
The problem with many algorithmic "stablecoin" designs is the assumption that there always will be speculators willing to take the risk in exchange of betting that peg will be restored. But unlike the designated market makers in some regulated markets, crypto speculators are not contractually obligated to take the risk.