https://www.investor.gov/protect-your-investments/fraud/type...
2. Algorithmic "stablecoins" don't work, in the same way as perpetuum mobile doesn't work. You think you're inventing a perpetuum mobile, but you're building a Rube Goldberg's machine instead ;)
3. Every algorithmic "stablecoin" can be traced to 2 papers published in 2014: Hayek Money and Robert Sams' Seigniorage Shares
the industry keeps chasing undercollateralized algo stablecoins because of capital efficiency. jon wu explains to laura shin, worth a watch: https://twitter.com/laurashin/status/1525505300219961344
DAI/MakerDAO isn't an algorithmic "stablecoin", it's an unregistered SEF (Swap Execution Facility) which should be regulated by the CFTC in the US, and similar agencies in other parts of the world.
The only reason DAI didn't broke the USD peg during the "crypto" bear market, is because OG's cost base of ETH was zero to 30 cents, and their objective was to save MakerDAO, rather than make a profit on their CDPs.
> the industry keeps chasing undercollateralized algo stablecoins because of capital efficiency.
Isn't it obvious? ;)
The energy industry also chased perpetuum mobile because of the fuel efficiency, so what?
IMO there are ways to design a capital-efficient low-volatility digital assets (not algorithmic "stablecoins" per say - they're impossible), but they will most-likely be illegal in any developed country, as they will be an exotic derivative instruments.
From the JTBD PoV, the job of the "stablecoins" is to hedge your exposure to the volatile "crypto" assets. The only way to do this is either to exchange them to a less volatile assets, or to enter into a contract with somebody else willing to take the risk in exchange for something.
what about makerdao makes it reliant on dao goodwill? the incentive to restore the peg is the expectation of profits from liquidating the overextended.
I didn't said that. Once they're listed on "exchanges" or traded on DEX, their price isn't under control of the protocol, and in theory can be anything.
>they promise to be able to repeg in times of severe distress. even some money markets broke the dollar. they had to be bailed out by the government.
MMFs are funds with the NAV which supposed to be around $1.00 (that in addition to earning an interest). In case the NAV goes under $0.95, the fund has to be liquidated. See "Breaking the Buck":
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/breaking-the-buck.asp
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/08/money-ma...
>what about makerdao makes it reliant on dao goodwill? the incentive to restore the peg is the expectation of profits from liquidating the overextended.
Why people kept locking ETH in MakerDAO CDPs over and over during the "crypto" bear market, when ETH was in the free fall? It doesn't make sense from the economic PoV. It only makes sense if your ETH is cheap and you want to prove that MakerDAO works.
Different agents optimize for different things. Some (most?) optimize for size of their wallet/bank account, others want to save their project/ecosystem. Both types are rational.
from your link:
> In 2008 however, the day after Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. filed for bankruptcy, one money market fund fell to 97 cents after writing off the debt it owned that was issued by Lehman. This created the potential for a bank run in money markets [...] the next day the United States Treasury announced a program to insure the holdings of publicly offered money market funds so that should a covered fund break the buck, investors would be protected to $1 NAV
if the US Treasury insured $ust, luna would have been fine
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> Why people kept locking ETH in MakerDAO CDPs over and over during the "crypto" bear market, when ETH was in the free fall?
they're long eth. it's not altruistic, it's incentive alignment.