zlacker

[parent] [thread] 89 comments
1. mingus+(OP)[view] [source] 2024-03-23 04:10:21
Cell phone tower data has been used for a decade now in pretty much the same way.

Did you happen to pass by a cell tower in a major city around the time a crime was committed? We all have.

Well, your IEMI was included in a cell tower dump. Probably dozens of times.

Did you happen to drive your car over any bridge in the Bay Area lately? Did a municipal vehicle pass you and catch your license plate with their ALPR camera?

Guess what? Your name went through a database of an LEO search if they wanted to find a perp for that time/location.

Privacy has been dead for a long time. The worst part is people don’t care.

The Snowden files changed nothing. If there was ever a point in history where people would have given up their cell phones for their civil liberties, that would have been the time to do it.

replies(9): >>godels+R2 >>ametra+v4 >>skybri+i7 >>andsoi+l7 >>riedel+69 >>jpc0+8k >>detour+xK >>salawa+4Q >>mistri+Yb1
2. godels+R2[view] [source] 2024-03-23 04:54:06
>>mingus+(OP)
> Cell phone tower data has been used for a decade now in pretty much the same way.

I was mad then. I'm more mad now. Stop these arguments because it isn't like one implies the other. And who the fuck cares if someone wasn't but is now. What's the argument, that you're a hipster? That's not solving problems. I don't want to gatekeep people from joining the movement to protect rights. I don't care if they joined as a tin foil hat or just yesterday after having literally been complacent in these atrocities. If you're here now, that's what matters.

> Privacy has been dead for a long time. The worst part is people don’t care.

Bull, and bull.

There are plenty of people fighting back. I'm pretty sure me getting ads in languages I don't speaks is at least some good sign. Maybe I can't beat the NSA, sure, but can I beat mass surveillance? Can I beat 10%? 50%? 80%? 1% is better than 0% and privacy will die when we decide everything is binary.

People care. People are tired. People feel defeated. These are different things. If people didn't care Apple (and even Google) wouldn't advertise themselves as privacy conscious. Signal wouldn't exist and wouldn't have 50 million users. It's not time to lay down and give up.

> mingus88 36 minutes ago | parent | context | flag | on: Google Ordered to Identify Who Watched Certain You...

Cell phone tower data has been used for a decade now in pretty much the same way.

Did you happen to pass by a cell tower in a major city around the time a crime was committed? We all have.

Well, your IEMI was included in a cell tower dump. Probably dozens of times.

Did you happen to drive your car over any bridge in the Bay Area lately? Did a municipal vehicle pass you and catch your license plate with their ALPR camera?

Guess what? Your name went through a database of an LEO search if they wanted to find a perp for that time/location.

Privacy has been dead for a long time. The worst part is people don’t care.

> The Snowden files changed nothing.

They didn't change enough, but that isn't nothing.

replies(2): >>alfied+4c >>johnny+Jmb
3. ametra+v4[view] [source] 2024-03-23 05:19:12
>>mingus+(OP)
You play right into their hands by being demoralised (and trying to spread that to others)
4. skybri+i7[view] [source] 2024-03-23 06:07:19
>>mingus+(OP)
This sounds scary, and yet I seem to be unharmed.
replies(3): >>ikekkd+Re >>sriram+Af >>alt227+gW
5. andsoi+l7[view] [source] 2024-03-23 06:08:47
>>mingus+(OP)
> Privacy has been dead for a long time. The worst part is people don’t care.

I would argue “people don’t care” because… there isn’t a high enough number of people who suffer negative consequences from “their privacy being invaded”.

replies(1): >>tacoca+2D4
6. riedel+69[view] [source] 2024-03-23 06:41:03
>>mingus+(OP)
IMHO the problem here is really transparency. There IMHO can be situation in which it could be reasonable. But the concrete cases might be questionable as we are probably not talking about capital crime.

In Berlin there used to be a notification system if you were subjected to cell surveillance in Berlin. It was recently stopped [0]. IMHO we need the same for all IP assignment or account lookups. The problem IMHO is that we, individualy, and particularly vulnerable groups like journalists and activists, might be subject to far more of such activities than we know.

[0] https://netzpolitik.org/2024/rolle-rueckwaerts-berlin-beende...

replies(2): >>Terr_+fc >>godels+ff
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7. alfied+4c[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 07:21:43
>>godels+R2
> > The Snowden files changed nothing. >They didn't change enough, but that isn't nothing.

The biggest change IMHO was the entire industry got off their collective assets to finally move to HTTPS.

replies(4): >>Jare+xc >>PeterS+5g >>whatsh+zh >>jjav+Ga2
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8. Terr_+fc[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 07:24:29
>>riedel+69
> notification system

More-generally, imagine if every citizen was entitled to a yearly report on all how many times law-enforcement received records containing their names or personally identifying information, except in cases that are formally unsolved and in-progress.

So a line item might be something like:

    {Ref ID}, {Date}, "All Youtube accounts that watched {Video Title}"
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9. Jare+xc[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 07:29:00
>>alfied+4c
I thought this was driven by ISPs inserting their own ads in normal HTTP.
replies(1): >>dbdudb+pj
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10. ikekkd+Re[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 08:08:31
>>skybri+i7
A case is criminal gangs buying from data brokers to scam elders
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11. godels+ff[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 08:15:53
>>riedel+69
I don't think anyone is saying that rights can't be infringed upon for any reason. The issue is that there needs be sufficient reason. Is this sufficient reason? I think the action is sufficient reason were it specifically targeted at the individual under suspicion. But a dragnet is not. Those innocent people were not under suspicion and were not doing anything wrong or illegal.
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12. sriram+Af[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 08:24:13
>>skybri+i7
Shall we wait on the laws until you personally come to some harm?
replies(1): >>skybri+pw1
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13. PeterS+5g[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 08:31:38
>>alfied+4c
Had nothing to do with Snowdon but with Google ranking algo changes. Google has a commercial interest of hindering competitors in the add brokering market from observing info on the wire.
replies(3): >>blitza+4j >>mike_h+Mr >>kevin_+wH
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14. whatsh+zh[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 08:56:46
>>alfied+4c
I wonder who's going to have to end up hiding out in a US-hostile part of the world for us to read this part of the cloudflare FAQ: https://developers.cloudflare.com/ssl/troubleshooting/faq/#w...
replies(3): >>wutwut+bm >>kuschk+yI >>rolph+NT
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15. blitza+4j[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 09:19:22
>>PeterS+5g
Google might just be the biggest advocate of https out there, certainly (from my recollection) post Snowden. There has been a lot of progress made over the years.

https://transparencyreport.google.com/https/overview

https://transparencyreport.google.com/safer-email/overview - transmitting email with some form of encryption is probably a bigger and completely unseen problem that is similar

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16. dbdudb+pj[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 09:25:21
>>Jare+xc
…no, it was definitely “HTTPS added/removed here”
17. jpc0+8k[view] [source] 2024-03-23 09:37:51
>>mingus+(OP)
There is a distinction I tend to make here.

If some person was able to pick me out from a lineup because they physically saw me then that wasn't private and privacy laws don't apply.

So for instance capturing my face on CCTV in a public place isn't a privacy violation, same with my license plate in a pulic place.

However what happens on my private property is a privacy violation if it is recorded without consent.

Certian information isn't private, and that being stored is fine. Where the line gets drawn is what's up for debate.

I surely would want my contact details and name saved by a company that I intend to do business with in either direction. However if they spam me with information I should be able to lodge an harrassment claim against them. It's not a privacy issue but a decency issue.

replies(4): >>chgs+Ym >>fmobus+2t >>zakki+mJ >>scarfa+7P
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18. wutwut+bm[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 10:11:55
>>whatsh+zh
The world’s largest MITM
replies(2): >>pbhjpb+Mm >>chgs+Sm
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19. pbhjpb+Mm[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 10:18:54
>>wutwut+bm
Lol, I'm a bit slow ... some USA TLA runs Cloudflare, right?
replies(1): >>wutwut+ty2
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20. chgs+Sm[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 10:20:33
>>wutwut+bm
Tech bros love it. And tailscale. And saas as a whole. Data sovereignty means you can’t be kind by the adtech industry so it’s not cool.
replies(2): >>vitno+4u >>j45+hW
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21. chgs+Ym[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 10:22:31
>>jpc0+8k
> However what happens on my private property is a privacy violation if it is recorded without consent.

And the biggest enablers of violation are things like ring doorbells and dashcams. There is no comeback in my country, don’t know about the US.

Governmental and commercial cctv has checks and balances. Domestic just goes onto planet wide databases with no control.

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22. mike_h+Mr[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 11:23:55
>>PeterS+5g
It had everything to do with Snowden. Source: I was at Google at the time he started leaking.

Before Snowden encryption was something that was mostly seen as a way to protect login forms. People knew it'd be nice to use it for everything but there were difficult technical and capacity/budget problems in the way because SSL was slow.

After Snowden two things happened:

1. Encryption of everything became the companies top priority. Budget became unlimited, other projects were shelved, whole teams were staffed to solve the latency problems. Not only for Google's own public facing web servers but all internal traffic, and they began working explicitly on working out what it'd take to get the entire internet to be encrypted.

2. End-to-end encryption of messengers (a misnomer IMHO but that's what they call it) went from an obscure feature for privacy and crypto nerds to a top priority project for every consumer facing app that took itself seriously.

The result was a massive increase in the amount of traffic that was encrypted. Maybe that would have eventually happened anyway, but it would have been far, far slower without Edward.

replies(2): >>KennyB+ED >>lern_t+dR
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23. fmobus+2t[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 11:40:50
>>jpc0+8k
That notion isn't universal. In Germany, for instance, I can't install a camera pointing to the street.
replies(3): >>jpc0+5v >>KennyB+hE >>broken+8Q6
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24. vitno+4u[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 11:53:06
>>chgs+Sm
Calling out tailscale here is odd considering it's peer-to-peer and encrypted.
replies(1): >>chgs+su
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25. chgs+su[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 11:59:18
>>vitno+4u
With keys controlled by a central entity
replies(1): >>Handpr+sy
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26. jpc0+5v[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 12:06:02
>>fmobus+2t
I understand that completely. Just wanted to give a different viewpoint on that.

I'm all for finding a balance, it's just that many times people are against surveillance that does actually improve security or enforcement but mildy infringes on their "rights" when in reality they never had privacy in that situation to start with and the use of technology didn't substantially change that.

Youtube being forced to give up personal information based on who viewed a video is something I don't see as an issue. How is this any different from any other website getting the exact same order?

If you are doing something shady you know how to obfuscate that information, if you aren't, sure your "privacy" was "violated" for sure but it was violated in a way that was legally allowed and by law enforcement at that.

Living in a surveillance state where I have no choice but for the government to be able to track every single transaction I make financially and being able to link my cell number amongst other details directly to me, I feel like if I had to try to fight that I would only be causing myself undue anxiety and I've got enough legitimate reasons to be anxious.

replies(4): >>partit+Pw >>KennyB+ME >>kortil+HF >>johnny+Tpb
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27. partit+Pw[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 12:24:27
>>jpc0+5v
Thank you for so eloquently explaining the bootlicking and privacy not caring mindset I’ve never understood. Also sorry that I can’t come up with a less worse way to say that
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28. Handpr+sy[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 12:40:42
>>chgs+su
do you have a source for that?
replies(1): >>mikeho+eL
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29. KennyB+ED[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 13:36:57
>>mike_h+Mr
That's nice and all, but the "why" is more important than the "what".

Google was driven not out of some panicked rush to protect user privacy, but to protect Google's collection and storage of user data.

Google has 10+ years of my email. It doesn't treat that like Fort Knox because it gives a shit about my privacy; it treats it like Fort Knox because it wants to use that for itself and provide services to others based off it.

You do know that Google was heavily seed-funded by the NSA, right?

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30. KennyB+hE[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 13:42:19
>>fmobus+2t
Unless you're wealthy and powerful.

I guarantee the very wealthy or politically powerful have plenty of very-well-hidden cameras surrounding their properties.

Those rules are to keep you from catching and proving the powerful doing something they shouldn't.

replies(1): >>fmobus+e03
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31. KennyB+ME[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 13:46:05
>>jpc0+5v
"Hunters don't kill the innocent animals - they look for the shifty-eyed ones that are probably the criminal element of their species!

If they're not guilty, why are they running?"

replies(1): >>jpc0+EN
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32. kortil+HF[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 13:53:50
>>jpc0+5v
> and the use of technology didn't substantially change that.

This is complete BS. Technology made it scalable to track where everyone is and query it historically. This used to require tailing someone so it couldn’t be done at scale.

replies(1): >>jpc0+qO
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33. kevin_+wH[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 14:16:05
>>PeterS+5g
There was literally a PowerPoint slide in the released docs implying they had backdoored Google's internal servers.
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34. kuschk+yI[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 14:24:26
>>whatsh+zh
See https://github.com/justjanne/stickers/blob/main/designs/ssl%...
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35. zakki+mJ[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 14:29:35
>>jpc0+8k
So, when your in your own property, cellular tower shouldn't be allowed to allow your mobile phone to register? Because they will record your IMEI while you are in your private property.
replies(2): >>willia+yK >>Etherl+n11
36. detour+xK[view] [source] 2024-03-23 14:37:54
>>mingus+(OP)
The concept introduced by the Supreme Court regarding Pen register is consistent with all the examples you have given.

Anytime you willing share data with a 3rd party the law assumes you aren't keeping it private.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pen_register

If you want to keep something private don't share it outside of your house.

replies(1): >>Geezus+8L
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37. willia+yK[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 14:38:01
>>zakki+mJ
Yeah but the electro-magnetic spectrum is a limited public good. You don’t own your broadcasted radio waves in the same way you own your house. Your cellphone is a pollutant.
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38. Geezus+8L[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 14:42:48
>>detour+xK
Except that existing in modern society requires giving immense amounts of personal information for even basic transactions.
replies(2): >>morkal+LP >>detour+201
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39. mikeho+eL[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 14:43:30
>>Handpr+sy
Tailscale [0] says the private keys never leave the device.

“Security

Tailscale and WireGuard offer identical point-to-point traffic encryption.

Using Tailscale introduces a dependency on Tailscale’s security. Using WireGuard directly does not. It is important to note that a device’s private key never leaves the device and thus Tailscale cannot decrypt network traffic. Our client code is open source, so you can confirm that yourself.”

0. https://tailscale.com/compare/wireguard

replies(2): >>sdht0+K01 >>d-z-m+Oc3
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40. jpc0+EN[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 15:03:27
>>KennyB+ME
I never said any of that.

What I said is for this specific point a smart criminal won't get caught and you too can very easily obfuscate that very same data.

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41. jpc0+qO[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 15:10:31
>>kortil+HF
That same technology has also dramatically increased the cost of doing that.

Data isn't free and processing big data isn't cheap. As much as Google has the data, that means they need to store that data.

You know what used to happen before and still happens now, an example. I live in a restricted access area. Restricted in the sense rhat to get in some guy needs to take your name and license plate.

For many many businesses parks in my country that is still the defacto. There isn't really a camera watching that other than general CCTV that probably doesn't have the resolution to pick up text on our license plates. It's cheaper for them to literally pay a guy to stand at a boom and get that information than to install the technology required to track that automatically.

replies(2): >>Nextgr+2R >>neural+at1
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42. scarfa+7P[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 15:15:36
>>jpc0+8k
> If some person was able to pick me out from a lineup because they physically saw me then that wasn't private and privacy laws don't apply

It’s not an invasion of privacy. But it is a problem for other reasons

https://nobaproject.com/modules/eyewitness-testimony-and-mem....

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43. morkal+LP[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 15:20:53
>>Geezus+8L
It's beyond absurd and desperately needs to be addressed. Too bad both the government and corporations stand to loose too much that I doubt it will be treated seriously.
replies(1): >>detour+d01
44. salawa+4Q[view] [source] 2024-03-23 15:23:17
>>mingus+(OP)
Most people don't know. Or if they know, they don't understand the implications. As Computer Scientists, part of pur whole shtick is to try to spread that lnowledge far and wide. Most, I hazard, spend precious little time on that particular responsibility.
replies(1): >>kmeist+wf3
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45. Nextgr+2R[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 15:31:54
>>jpc0+qO
> Data isn't free

The adtech industry made data and its processing not just free (as in more than covered by the ad revenue) but outright profitable.

This is frankly a one-in-a-lifetime gift to the government because we've not only built an unaccountable industrial-grade spying machine but the government doesn't even have to pay for it as it pays for itself and incentivizes its own expansion.

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46. lern_t+dR[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 15:34:30
>>mike_h+Mr
You were at Google at the time, but your memory of the ordering of events is off. Google used HTTPS everywhere before Snowden.[1][2] HTTPS on just the login form protects the password to prevent a MITM from collecting it and using it on other websites, but it doesn't prevent someone from just taking the logged in cookie and reusing it on the same website. That was a known issue before Snowden, and Google had already addressed it. Many other websites, including Yahoo, didn't start using HTTPS everywhere until after Snowden.[3] I know because this was something I was interested in when using public WiFi points that were popping up at the time. I also remember when Facebook moved their homepage to HTTPS.[4] Previously, only the login form POSTed to an HTTPS endpoint, but that doesn't protect against the login form being modified by a MITM to have a different action for the MITM to get your password, rendering the whole thing useless.

What changed after Snowden was how Google encrypts traffic on its network, according to an article quoting you at the time.[5]

[1]https://gmail.googleblog.com/2010/01/default-https-access-fo...

[2]https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/10/making-search-more-s...

[3]https://www.zdnet.com/article/yahoo-finally-enables-https-en...

[4]https://techcrunch.com/2012/11/18/facebook-https/

[5]https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/11/googl...

replies(3): >>pkaedi+371 >>fl0ki+Zh1 >>mike_h+5p1
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47. rolph+NT[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 16:00:25
>>whatsh+zh
a single encryption is for the stone age.

if [pecadillo] must remain secret when your nieghbour is investigated for [crime?] then encrypt at least twice, and obfusicate the original message

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48. alt227+gW[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 16:20:10
>>skybri+i7
Then they came for me. And there was no one left to speak out for me
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49. j45+hW[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 16:20:19
>>chgs+Sm
Not sure what the issue is with Tailscale, especially since you can self-host Headscale server locally to get the same effect.
replies(1): >>chgs+nB2
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50. detour+201[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 16:44:45
>>Geezus+8L
We all have choices to make. I avoid all sorts of things people consider indispensable.

2 examples are not having an amazon prime account and running my own mail server.

replies(1): >>johnny+2ob
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51. detour+d01[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 16:46:18
>>morkal+LP
I personally think that the Apple anti-trust is being pushed due to their privacy stance.

Apple looked at the pen register cases and realized the best position to be in as a third party is to not possess usable data.

The US case from my point of view is trying to fore Apple to share user data with third parties.

replies(1): >>kmeist+4f3
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52. sdht0+K01[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 16:51:09
>>mikeho+eL
To add to that, they also provides Tailnet lock [0], which protects from the only way the coordination server can mess with the tailnets, by connecting unauthorized nodes.

[0] https://tailscale.com/kb/1226/tailnet-lock

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53. Etherl+n11[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 16:56:16
>>zakki+mJ
Both the radio waves his cell phone emits, and the information (voltage change of an ADSL line or photons moving in an optic fiber) used to communicate over the Internet, actually leave his home, and then are registered. So I think in nature it's the same as sending a letter. So let's symmetrically consider that you send a letter, and police/agency asks the post office to attach to each letter information (from, to, weight, stamp...) the phone number from their database. If that happens for all letters going through a given sorting room, I can understand how that's an abuse.
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54. pkaedi+371[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 17:41:33
>>lern_t+dR
Right, I remember (as an outsider to google) the push for https coming after Firesheep [1] and the google research on the actual CPU cost of https [2], both in 2010. Snowden's revelations came in 2013.

[1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firesheep [2] https://www.imperialviolet.org/2010/06/25/overclocking-ssl.h...

55. mistri+Yb1[view] [source] 2024-03-23 18:17:45
>>mingus+(OP)
"people do not care" - Please stop repeating this false statement. When you repeat it you give it legitimacy, and take the time when other statements could be made.

Most people are helpless to make change. Greater than one million adults serve in uniform services of some kind where they literally must comply. The ad budgets and massive, overflowing volumes of money generated by "surveillance capitalism" buy the consent of the mercenary finance occupations. None of this means "nobody cares"

replies(1): >>johnny+2rb
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56. fl0ki+Zh1[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 19:08:03
>>lern_t+dR
An important clarification is that the leaks about NSA snooping on Google motivated end-to-end encryption between all pairs of Google internal services. It was a technical marvel, every Stubby connection had mutual TLS without any extra code or configuration required. Non-Stubby traffic needed special security review because it had to reinvent much of the same.

People even got internal schwag shirts made of the iconic "SSL added and removed here" note [1]. It became part of the culture.

Over a decade later I still see most environments incur a lot of dev & ops overhead to get anywhere close to what Google got working completely transparently. The leak might have motivated the work, but the insight that it had to be automatic, foolproof, and universal is what made it so effective.

[1] https://blog.encrypt.me/2013/11/05/ssl-added-and-removed-her...

replies(1): >>mike_h+fp1
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57. mike_h+5p1[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 20:12:24
>>lern_t+dR
The first two links are about Gmail and personalized results in web search specifically. Even as late as 2011 SSL being activated for a product was treated as unusual enough to write blog posts about, and it was up to individual projects whether or not to activate it and how to trade off the latency costs.

You're right that I might be mis-remembering the ordering of things, but I'm pretty sure by the time Snowden came around the vast majority of traffic was still unencrypted. Bearing in mind that lot of Google's traffic was stuff you wouldn't necessarily think of, like YouTube Thumbnails, map tiles and Omaha pings (for software update). Web search and Gmail by that point made up a relatively small amount of it, albeit valuable. Look at how the Chrome updater does update checks and you'll discover it uses some weird custom protocol which exists purely because at the time it was designed Google was in a massive LB CPU capacity crunch caused by turning on SSL for as many services as possible. Omaha controlled the client so had the flexibility to do cryptographic offload and was pushed to do so, to free up capacity for other services.

> What changed after Snowden was how Google encrypts traffic on its network, according to an article quoting you at the time.[5]

That also changed and did so at enormous speed, but I'm pretty sure by June 2013 most external traffic still didn't have TLS applied. It looks like Facebook started going all-SSL just 8 months before Snowden.

replies(1): >>lern_t+X22
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58. mike_h+fp1[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 20:13:50
>>fl0ki+Zh1
A minor quibble; iirc it was only connections that crossed datacenters that were encrypted. RPC connections within a cluster didn't need it, as the fiber taps were all done on the long distance fibers or at telco switching centers.

But otherwise you're totally right. I suspect the NSA got a nasty shock when the internal RPCs started becoming encrypted nearly overnight, just weeks after the "added and removed here" presentation. The fact that Google could roll out a change of that magnitude and at that speed, across the entire organization, would have been quite astonishing to them. And to think... all that work reverse engineering the internal protocols, burned in a matter of weeks.

replies(1): >>lern_t+C22
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59. neural+at1[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 20:53:04
>>jpc0+qO
> It's cheaper for them to literally pay a guy to stand at a boom and get that information than to install the technology required to track that automatically.

It depends of the local cost of labor, also the technology is easier to scale, imagine New York City having employees at the bridges writing all the entering license plates! And searching through those records how many times a certain plate entered the city on a given time frame. To me the problem with technology is that they’re used for lazy policing to just inflate the numbers of solved cases. There were cases of cops feeding hand-drawn suspects to face recognition software. Every case becomes a “throw something to the wall and see what sticks”.

replies(1): >>jpc0+NI2
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60. skybri+pw1[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-23 21:31:41
>>sriram+Af
No, but the argument did use "you" to imply that the reader was harmed. I consider that an illegitimate scare tactic. It would be better to talk about how someone else might be harmed.
replies(1): >>johnny+tsb
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61. lern_t+C22[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-24 04:50:00
>>mike_h+fp1
According to the reporting at the time, the NSA has shut down the email metadata collection program, which was the only leaked NSA program that parsed data on those taps, back in 2011; so the reverse engineering work was burned by an interagency review two years prior to Google's cross-datacenter encryption work.
replies(1): >>mike_h+hs2
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62. lern_t+X22[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-24 04:56:21
>>mike_h+5p1
I had completely forgotten about YouTube. I think it switched to https video serving post-Snowden, but I can't find the announcement.

Edit: Here it is. Only 25% of YouTube's traffic was encrypted at the start of 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20160802000052/https://youtube-e...

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63. jjav+Ga2[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-24 07:59:47
>>alfied+4c
> The biggest change IMHO was the entire industry got off their collective assets to finally move to HTTPS.

And then promptly moved most things behind cloudflare, which is MITMing everything, undoing the benefit of HTTPS.

Remember "SSL added and removed here!"? Now it happens at cloudflare.

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64. mike_h+hs2[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-24 12:30:54
>>lern_t+C22
They were tapping replication traffic on a database that included login IP addresses. I remember it well because it was a database my team had put there.
replies(1): >>lern_t+zw3
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65. wutwut+ty2[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-24 13:46:58
>>pbhjpb+Mm
tin foil hat time, but who do you think the MITM is for?
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66. chgs+nB2[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-24 14:19:57
>>j45+hW
Headscale is fine. With tailscale they control the deployment of public keys to devices, and can thus deploy anything they want to.
replies(1): >>j45+D03
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67. jpc0+NI2[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-24 15:29:48
>>neural+at1
Your complaint seems more like a failing legal system than unnecessary surveillance.

Legitimately if an investigator put a hard drawn sketch through facial recognition and that was even remotely allowed into evidence by the court then the suspect evidence wasn't the issue

replies(1): >>neural+fl9
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68. fmobus+e03[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-24 18:00:42
>>KennyB+hE
I... well, I will be honest, this is the first time I've heard someone arguing that street facing CCTV was meant to catch _that_ kind of wrongdoing.

For the German context, and for the kind of CCTV I'm talking about, it makes no sense thou.

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69. j45+D03[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-24 18:04:20
>>chgs+nB2
Good to know.

Have they ever deployed anything they want to devices?

replies(1): >>broken+z14
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70. d-z-m+Oc3[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-24 19:37:29
>>mikeho+eL
That is true as far as it goes, but how does your node learn the public keys of the other nodes in your tailnet? My understanding is that they are provided by the coordination server, so you have to trust that the public key the coordination server gives you is actually the one for your peer device.

Tailnet lock helps mitigate this by requiring that node public keys are signed by a trusted signing node, but it isn't bulletproof.

replies(1): >>Aerbil+H24
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71. kmeist+4f3[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-24 19:50:24
>>detour+d01
How would a successful antitrust verdict against Apple further the NSA's implicit dogma of "insecure by default"? Especially if it winds up breaking up Apple into many pieces. It's far easier for a centralized tech industry to bend the knee to the NSA than a distributed one.
replies(2): >>detour+5i3 >>broken+Qp6
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72. kmeist+wf3[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-24 19:53:14
>>salawa+4Q
Most people think Facebook secretly records all their conversations because their ad tracking is just that good. They don't know the root cause but they absolutely do understand the implications.
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73. detour+5i3[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-24 20:09:11
>>kmeist+4f3
Forcing Apple to hand over data to a third party for commercial reasons (not needing a warrant) is much simpler than whatever scenario you have worked out.
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74. lern_t+zw3[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-24 22:05:40
>>mike_h+hs2
I missed that leak. Any chance you have a link for me to fill in my gap?
replies(1): >>mike_h+ao4
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75. broken+z14[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-25 04:23:54
>>j45+D03
The direction you're heading in sounds very similar to the arguments that may have been made pre-Snowden about mass-surveillance.
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76. Aerbil+H24[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-25 04:41:07
>>d-z-m+Oc3
Public key cryptography doesn’t work like that. If you were given wrong public keys you wouldn’t be able to connect to start with.
replies(1): >>d-z-m+sN4
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77. mike_h+ao4[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-25 09:41:58
>>lern_t+zw3
Slide 5 (Serendipity - New protocols) in this presentation:

https://github.com/iamcryptoki/snowden-archive/blob/master/d...

It's heavily redacted but the parts that are visible show they were targeting BigTable replication traffic (BTI_TabletServer RPCs) for "kansas-gaia" (Gaia is their account system), specifically the gaia_permission_whitelist table which was one of the tables used for the login risk analysis. You can see the string "last_logins" in the dump.

Note that the NSA didn't fully understand what they were looking at. They thought it was some sort of authentication or authorization RPC, but it wasn't.

In order to detect suspicious logins, e.g. from a new country or from an IP that's unlikely to be logging in to accounts, the datacenters processing logins needed to have a history of recent logins for every account. Before around 2011 they didn't have this - such data existed but only in logs processing clusters. To do real time analytics required the data to be replicated with low latency between clusters. The NSA were delighted by this because real-time IP address info tied to account names is exactly what they wanted. They didn't have it previously because a login was processed within a cluster, and user-to-cluster traffic was protected by SSL. After the authentication was done inter-cluster traffic related to a user was done using opaque IDs and tokens. I know all about this because I initiated and ran the anti-hijacking project there in about 2010.

The pie chart on slide 6 shows how valuable this traffic was to them. "Google Authorization, Security Question" and "gaia // permission_whitelist" (which are references to the same system) are their top target by far, followed by "no content" (presumably that means failed captures or something). The rest is some junk like indexing traffic that wouldn't have been useful to them.

Fortunately the BT replication traffic was easy to encrypt, as all the infrastructure was there already. It just needed a massive devops and capacity planning effort to get it turned on for everything.

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78. tacoca+2D4[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-25 11:57:08
>>andsoi+l7
Maybe people would care more if there were more then two viable political parties to choose from?

Getting rid of First Past The Post voting in favor of something like Ranked Choice voting would allow people to vote 3rd party with no chance of a spoiler effect. This would introduce competition into the electoral process, improving the quality of candidates available to choose from. Even from within the current two mainstream political parties.

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79. d-z-m+sN4[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-25 13:08:30
>>Aerbil+H24
> Public key cryptography doesn’t work like that

Like what? I'm saying both sides of the connection would be given the wrong public keys by the coordination server. The private keys of which would be held by a MITM.

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80. broken+Qp6[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-25 22:38:55
>>kmeist+4f3
>It's far easier for a centralized tech industry to bend the knee to the NSA than a distributed one.

I don't agree. NSA can hack/pressure smaller companies much easier than a giant like Apple.

replies(1): >>johnny+vnb
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81. broken+8Q6[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-26 02:16:51
>>fmobus+2t
Are businesses allowed to install cameras facing the street?
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82. neural+fl9[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-26 21:53:04
>>jpc0+NI2
I don’t recall the actual case but what I try to point out is that technologies are used as dragnets to “fish anything” be it facial recognition, cell tower logs or license plate reads. I’m all out in favor of using any tool to catch criminals but not to manufacture them, specially when the only goal is revenues for the agency du jour.
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83. johnny+Jmb[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-27 16:08:29
>>godels+R2
>Stop these arguments because it isn't like one implies the other. And who the fuck cares if someone wasn't but is now. What's the argument, that you're a hipster?

That we are nothing in the ocean of people who don't care. Someone upended their entire life to whistleblow on the government doing it as hard proof and no one cares (from a statistical POV, not a "literally 100% of the population" way).

They cared more about the boston bombing the month prior, which while tragic is a statistical molecule compared to the impact of what Snowden revealed.

>There are plenty of people fighting back.

This can be a game of numbers, but it isn't. This can be a game of power, but it isn't. Not enough people are fighting back and not enough powerful people are fighting back.

>People care. People are tired. People feel defeated. These are different things

well it sounds like they gave up. Different words, samae results

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84. johnny+vnb[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-27 16:13:28
>>broken+Qp6
easier but you get less data. There's thousands of small knees to get to bend to. More points of failures for public outings Centralizing it to one company makes everyone's lives easieer.
replies(1): >>kmeist+TFi
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85. johnny+2ob[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-27 16:15:40
>>detour+201
Given recent events, I don't think Amazon Prime is that necessary anymore.

Mail servers, sure. The big issue there is another annoying pseudo-monopoly issue where so many major email servers assume anything not from [major email server] is spam, so you may not even get to communicate properly. More sticks for the fire.

replies(1): >>detour+L7c
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86. johnny+Tpb[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-27 16:25:19
>>jpc0+5v
>Youtube being forced to give up personal information based on who viewed a video is something I don't see as an issue. How is this any different from any other website getting the exact same order?

Scale. This isn't "supbpeona to get all of Bob's info", it's "subpeona to get information on all of the people's info tangentially related to bob". Imagine if this was as tangential as "who watched this video with 10m views"? is the YT history of 10m people worth it? Is it even useful?

The issue comes down to whether or not "Youtube" is a public place. All logistical terms point to "no", hence this story.

>your "privacy" was "violated" for sure but it was violated in a way that was legally allowed and by law enforcement at that.

That isn't how court orders work. They cannot make a single order to search an entire neighborhood's worth of houses because of drugs or whatever. That'd be N orders which may or may not go through based on the arguments made.

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87. johnny+2rb[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-27 16:31:14
>>mistri+Yb1
>Please stop repeating this false statement.

Society, please stop making it true.

>Most people are helpless to make change.

you get even 10,000 people to petition something to the government and you can get something rolling. This relatively moderate post probably had 10,000 views. You don't need to do much but you just got to get enough people to care enough to spend 10 minutes making a request. If they can't even do that much... well, they don't care.

This is the issue with an individualistic mindset, you hyperfocus on what immediately benefits you. Not the wider community around you which is needed for such petitioning.

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88. johnny+tsb[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-27 16:38:17
>>skybri+pw1
If you weren't one of the 30k watching the video, you are the "someone else".
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89. detour+L7c[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-27 20:10:58
>>johnny+2ob
I'm anything but a major mail provider and I don't have any issues. I did have some hiccups around 2008 and had to implement DMARC-DKIM. I use strict delivery so my mail server must delivery all mail directly.

Occasionally people have a vanity domain email that bounces back to me. I have to search the headers for the actual email address and re-send.

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90. kmeist+TFi[view] [source] [discussion] 2024-03-29 21:22:22
>>johnny+vnb
Furthermore the NSA/FBI/CIA want all their spying behavior to be secret. If you have to bend a lot of small knees then someone's going to fib before they get the data they want. And moving off a small company that's bent the knee is way easier than moving off FAANG, which can keep secrets[0] and has your balls locked in a vise.

[0] Because, among other things, the whole "Surprise and Delight" doctrine demands internal controls and secret-keeping discipline not that far off from an actual intelligence agency

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