Having gone through an acquisition, I guarantee that our acquired org gets more than 150 emails from our acquirer every two years. Let alone each day. To call it a "subsidiary" is ludicrous.
What controls when you have to respond to them is the law, not them. You'll know when that is, because it'll come with legal process.
It’s still very interesting data. Now I want to know how this compares to the other big tech companies.
I've had some contact with the FBI over the years regarding stuff happening on one of my sites and they were - it has to be said - polite and arguing their case quite well, in no way did I feel like figuring out whether if I refused them what the next step would be, it felt like I would be the unreasonable party. But if they had made an unreasonable request I would have told them to fuck off.
It's absurdly easy for Musk and his cronies to cherry-pick which pieces of context they do or do not include, to make any user's behavior seem more benign or nefarious than it really was. Every time they reveal something, we should ask what they're leaving out. Anyone who fails to do so, whether they're a journalist or an HN commenter, is effectively doing Musk's dirty work for free.
One is none of their business the other is expected.
To give you some numbers: I operated an international community with about 1 million members over the course of 20 years. During that time the number of requests were larger than the number of requests that have been detailed here regarding Twitter, which is one of the reasons why I believe that we are seeing a highly colored picture.
BTW every week is of course constant but so is one a year or once every ten years. It's constant but not often.
Additionally an email isn't an individual issue; an email thread almost always has multiple replies, forwards, etc. On the low end, if we assume only 4 emails per topic between the parties, that means the FBI only approached twitter 75ish times in three years, or 25 issues per year.
I can tell you from my time doing social media threat monitoring that I'd monitor and alert organizations of maybe 10-15 people per month for things like threatening to blow up buildings followed with active attempts to recruit people to support those efforts. And that's for relatively niche, unpoliticized, institutions.
If the FBI is only identifying and acting on 25 instances of active recruitment for crime on twitter per year, it doesn't indicate that they're strong-arming twitter. It means they're asleep at the wheel.
If the worst Taibbi can find is the FBI trying to take down a tweet trying to get republicans to vote on the wrong day, he's found fuck all.
> If the FBI is only identifying and acting on 25 instances of active recruitment for crime on twitter per year, it doesn't indicate that they're strong-arming twitter. It means they're asleep at the wheel.
... or it could be they're not wanting to identify and act on their own entrapment (oops I mean sting) operations.