Mind: I'm not arguing that science doesn't make mistakes. Science is a mistake-making-and-correcting process. But there are certain fields of science, somewhat more so in the social than physical and biological sciences, in which a widely-adopted plausible theoretical understanding seems missing.
Science seems to move through stages, of observation and categorisation, to individual models of localised predictive (or descriptive) understanding, to a fundamental theoretical underpinning.
Geology and biology are interesting cases, each being effectively ancient, but for which the establishment of the underlying theory lies largely within human memory.
In the case of biology, taxonomic classification, Darwin's theory of evolution based on variation, inheritence, and selection, Mendelian genetics, and finally the discovery of the structure and reading of DNA and RNA by Watson, Crick, and others (1950s) cast the final links in the chain. We're strengthening those, but the underlying model seems largely complete.
(I'd count concepts of dissipative systems as largely conformant with this model, though important additions.)
For geology, similarly, there was the notion of stratigraphy, which established an ordering but not a specific timescale for geology. Understanding of that didn't occur until the work of Rutherford, Soddy, Holmes, and Boltwood, largely in the first decade of the 20th century.
At the time, the leading scientific value for the age of the Earth was 20 millions of years, by William Thomson, Lord Kelvin (reduced from an earlier estimate of 100 million years). Rutherford and Boltwood's initial measurements based on radioactive decay demonstrated a timescale of billions of years, subsequently refined to the present value of 4.6 billion +/- 1% in the 1950s.
That still didn't explain much geological activity, particularly vulcanology, earthquakes, uplifts, and subsidence (though sedimentation and erosion were well understood). That required the notion of plate tectonics and continental drift, formally adopted only in 1965-1967 (by various conferences / professional bodies).
Plate tectonics, driven by residual thermal heat of formation and radioactive decay in the Earth's core and mantle is now considered the theoretical underpinning of all of geology. It's formal adoption is 55 years old, for a study that's existed since the time of ancient Greece.
The social sciences -- sociology, psychology, political economy, and political science -- lack any such empirically demonstratable and falsifiable theoretcal underpinning. To a large extent they've resisted adopting one.
That last point isn't uncommon -- biology certainaly resisted evolution, and geology plate tectonic (see Naomi Oreske's works on this topic, themselves fascinating studies of the evolution of scientific theory: https://www.worldcat.org/search?qt=worldcat_org_all&q=au%3Ao...).
And as with pre-genetic biology, pre-tectonic geology, pre-Newtonian physics, and pre-Mendeleevian chemistry, there are useful concepts, models, methods, and mathematical relations in these fields. But not a true unifying theoretic basis.
https://invidio.us/watch?v=BAjN6bG7XzM
(There's a paper, I'm not sure if it's published, I received it directly from Keen, will research.)
There's Thorstein Veblen's provocative question as to why economics is not an evolutionary science: https://archive.org/details/jstor-1882952
There's the difficulty economics has, generally, in even settling on basic questions: what is wealth (is it a stock or a flow? how is it measured?)? What is money? What is value?
W. Brian Arthur notes in one of his books that virtually all economics is aimed at policy, and that as a consequence there's very little purely theoretical foundation. (His own contribution has been on complexity economics, with several interesting contributions and two notable seminars.)
Of the set of sciences here, political science is the one I can comment the least on, though if it should also happen to revolve and evolve largely around policy rather than theoretic discussion, it may be afflicted by similar dynamics as economics, and a casual observation suggests it is.
My reading is that the social sciences generally should probably be formulated as systems sciences, and there've been some attempts, mostly solidly rejected, at doing so. Norbert Weiner's exceedingly cringily-named On the Humane Use of Human Beings (the book is vastly better than its title suggests) was an attempt at this. There's another by Alfred Kuhn (no relation to Thomas), of the University of Cincinnati, The study of society : a unified approach (https://www.worldcat.org/title/study-of-society-a-unified-ap...)
The systems dynamics approach of Jay Forrester and others would be another.
The organisation of M.I.T.'s study of psychology, "Brain and Cognitive Sciences" (formed through departmental mergers in 1986) reflects one approach.
My view of pscyhology and sociology is that they are studies of behaviour, of individuals and groups, on the basis of perceptions, information processing, and interactions, subject to evolutionary and other influences, as well as various pathologies.
Many psychological disorders seem to me more akin to cancer in physical medicine, as opposed to infectious diseases: they concern symptom clusters which may have multiple and diverse underlying etiologies, rather than of specific cause-centered disorders.
The distinction is that if you can identify a specific underlying causal agent (say: bacterium or virus, or some environmental insult), you can focus treatment on eliminating or attacking that specific cause.
If you have a symptom cluster with multiple possible etiologies, you risk falling into the One True Way trap, thinking that one identified cause is all causes.
Robert Sapolsky's lecture on depression and the various ways in which various types of behaviour-regulating neurotransmitters can malfunction is an example of the underlying messaging complexity within psychology:
https://invidio.us/watch?v=NOAgplgTxfc
I'm less versed again on sociology, and would speak less to its specific failures and more what I've noted looking through survey texts: that there doesn't seem to be any single underlying organisational premise. Again I'd suggest that this be as a systems science, here looking at groups of people (from couples/teams to all of humanity), and various behaviours. "Evolution" here would include both biological and cultural transmission of information.
The increasing specialisation both between and within academic domains, grants-making processes, various forms of gatekeeping and academic jealousies, all contribute to this.
The capitalist-communist antipathy throughout much of the 20th century also created major impediments, on both sides. Each camp was highly ideologically motivated, each used a consolidation of political power to drive academic policy and practice, and each side tended to both cultivate groupthink around certain concepts and mark others as taboo.
The Soviet Bloc notably preempted explorations in biology. The Western states greatly suppressed anything remotely touching on Marxist concepts (of which there is both bad and good). There were some shared areas of neglect (notably environmental concerns) and of focus (nuclear energy, weapons, jet propulsion, and space flight).
The interactions of power, ideology, and academic interests is ... pretty fascinating of itself.