[1] https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/qubes-devel/MfHy2jmX...
But PCI passthrough for gaming isn't a great fit for the Qubes security model: it requires trusting that the Windows guest cannot compromise the GPU you loan it, which makes it a much bigger risk than an ordinary AppVM.
Yes, a dedicated machine for gaming would certainly be better. But I play only irregularly and games like Divinity: Original Sin, Pillars of Eternity etc. which I kind of trust to don't hijack the GPU.
And graphics cards are messy. Many of them are frankly a lot like accessing main memory without an MMU. It's extremely easy to get scrapes of other application's video RAM that hasn't been zeroed.
I'm not trying to tell you you shouldn't do it of course. Just... be aware. "hijack the GPU" doesn't even require a whole lot of malice. I've had video memory of my firefox tabs from last shutdown draped across my screen while the lightdm login windows do their first paint, for example. This is just the world we live in :(
Do you mean these controls are porous by design or are you talking about bugs in the IOMMU protections?
Next time your PC going to boot your GPU will be initialized with host BIOS / UEFI long before kernel get possibility to limit it with IOMMU.
No worries, I did not undertand it that way. I like it if users try to keep the awareness about potential security problems up.