zlacker

That guy you mention in spite of his very technical background also avoided the technical details and possibly also tried to sensationalize: I was worried as he claimed that the SSH is broken, but it seems that there is no document that states that for the passive capture of the SSH traffic (at least the documents are there and everybody can analyse them).

However we already knew for a while that the active attacks are being done:

http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/07/north-kore...

The active attack can of course obtain enough information to decrypt the traffic automatically afterwards or even record it unencrypted. It appears that's the context of the SSH decryption in the documents.

>>acqq+(OP)
When will you guys all wake up? GCHQ does the full take on the cables, and there is no document yet, that claims NSA doesn't.

So, all your sessions are hosed at some point in time. Either now or in the future.

And yes, sensationalize is sometimes necessary to get more folks onboard to work with the documents.

>>spacef+g
So what if they are stored? There has been a big shift towards using perfect-forward-secrecy as default in the last 18 months.

>>dmix+z
Can't you see the pattern? Take all, break the crypto later. PFS might be next, who knows.

Yes, for now OTR and PGP is fine. There must be a big speculation on future breakthroughs regarding breaking crypto - otherwise they wouldn't build Bluffdale.

Edit: Instead of downvoting, how about taking position?

>>spacef+51
It's not that the PFS is known to be broken, it's that it's actually still very rarely used (1)

The present is problematic enough, we don't even need to hypothesize on the future breakages.

1) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy

"As of December 2014, 20.0% of TLS-enabled websites are configured to use cipher suites that provide forward secrecy to web browsers."

IPSEC is also often configured with the disabled PFS, even if the RFC is from 1998 ( http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2412 )

>>spacef+51
"PFS might be next, who knows"? What does that even mean? OTR and TLS PFS are closely related.

>>tptace+K4
Even when the PFS is configured, the defaults can be faulty:

https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/06/27/botchingpfs.html

"I'm not aware of any open source servers that support anything like that."

The article is from June 2013, has anything changed since?

>>acqq+ck
Most sites that enable PFS do so with solid ECDH. It's hard to find PFS configuration guidelines that will give you breakable conventional DH groups.

The latter half of AGL's post is about systems security, not (really) the cryptographic security of TLS. It's about things you can do that would make NSA owning up your servers a greater or lesser threat to previously encrypted TLS sessions.