zlacker

Best practices usually call for not exposing the SSH endpoints to the public internet. The principal risk is vulnerabilities in the underlying SSH server implementation. Historically, critical flaws that can compromise you are few and far between. However, these days AI is already starting to become adept at reverse engineering.

If you must, you'd typically use a bastion host that's configured just for the purpose of handing inbound SSH connections, and is locked down to a maximal degree. It then routes SSH traffic to your other machines internally.

I'd argue that model is outdated though, and the prevailing preference is putting SSH behind the firewall on internal networks. Think Wireguard, Tailscale, service meshes, and so on.

With AWS, restricting SSH ports via security groups to just your IP is simple and goes a long way.

>>rl3+(OP)
But doesn’t your argument that the principal risk [with ssh] is vulnerabilities also apply to the alternatives you say is best practice? Firewalling off ssh (but not http(s)) has the risk of vulns in the FW software. Tailscale, wireguard etc also has the risk of vulns in that software?

So what’s the difference in risk of ssh software vulns and other software vulns?

Also, another point of view is that vulnerabilities are not very high on the risk ladder. Weak passwords, password reuse etc are far greater risks. So, the alternatives to ssh you suggest are all reliant on passwords but ssh, in the case, is based on secure keys and no passwords. Should “best practices” not include this perpective?

>>Msurro+Ef
Good defense is layered.

For vulnerabilities, complexity usually equals surface area. WireGuard was created with simplicity in mind.

>So, the alternatives to ssh you suggest are all reliant on passwords but ssh, in the case, is based on secure keys and no passwords.

WireGuard is key-based. I highly suggest reading its whitepaper:

https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard.pdf