zlacker

I'm sure that will contribute to the illusion of security, but in reality the system is thoroughly backdoored on every level from the CPU on up, and everyone knows it.

There is no such thing as computer security, in general, at this point in history.

>>its_ma+(OP)
> but in reality the system is thoroughly backdoored on every level from the CPU on up, and everyone knows it.

Indeed. Why lock your car door as anyone can unlock and steal it by learning lock-picking?

>>its_ma+(OP)
There's a subtlety that's missing here: if your threat model doesn't include the actors who can access those backdoors, then computer security isn't so bad these days.

That subtlety is important because it explains how the backdoors have snuck in — most people feel safe because they are not targeted, so there's no hue and cry.

>>ashish+P
Residents of San Francisco ask themselves that question all the time.

>>rectan+j1
The backdoors snuck in because literally everyone is being targeted. Few people ever see the impact of that themselves or understand the chain of events that brought those impacts about.

>>autoex+i5
And yet, many people perceive a difference between “getting hacked” and “not getting hacked” and believe that certain precautions materially affect whether or not they end up having to deal with a hacking event.

Are they wrong? Do gradations of vulnerability exist? Is there only one threat model, “you’re already screwed and nothing matters”?

>>its_ma+(OP)
I'm sure you're right; however, there is still a distinction between the state using my device against me and unaffiliated or foreign states using my device against me or more likely simply to generate cash for themselves.

It's still worth solving one of these problems.