zlacker

The only solution I can think of at the moment is a human in the loop, authorising every sensitive action. Of course it has the classic tradeoff between convenience and security, but it would work. For it to work properly, the human needs to take a minute or so reviewing the content associated with request before authorising the action.

For most actions that don't have much content, this could work well as a simple phone popup where you authorise or deny.

The annoying parts would be if you want the agent to reply to an email that has a full PDF or a lot of text, you'd have to review to make sure the content does not include prompt injections. I think this can be further mitigated and improved with static analysis tools specifically for this purpose.

But I think it helps to think of it not as a way to prevent LLMs to be prompt injected. I see social engineering as the equivalent of prompt injection but for humans. So if you have a personal assistant, you'd also them to be careful with that and to authorise certain sensitive actions every time they happen. And you would definitely want this for things like making payments, changing subscriptions, etc.

>>rellfy+(OP)
You might be okaying actions hundreds or thousands of times before you encounter an injection attack, at which point you probably aren't reading things before you approve.

>>jmcgou+bW7
I agree, that's the main issue with this approach. Long-term, it should only be used for truly sensitive actions. More mundane things like replying to emails will need a better solution.