Clever Hans was exposed because the effect disappeared under controlled conditions. Blind the observers, remove human cues, and the behavior vanished. The entire lesson of Clever Hans is not “people can fool themselves,” it’s “remove the hidden channel and see if the effect survives.” That test is exactly what has been done here, repeatedly.
LLM capability does not disappear when you remove human feedback. It does not disappear under automatic evaluation. It does not disappear across domains, prompts, or tasks the model was never trained or rewarded on. In fact, many of the strongest demonstrations people point to are ones where no human is in the loop at all: program synthesis benchmarks, math solvers, code execution tasks, multi-step planning with tool APIs, compiler error fixing, protocol following. These are not magic tricks performed for an audience. They are mechanically checkable outcomes.
Your framing quietly swaps “some people misunderstand the tech” for “therefore the tech itself is misunderstood in kind.” That’s a rhetorical move, not an argument. Yes, lots of people are confused. That has no bearing on whether the system internally models structure or just parrots. The horse didn’t suddenly keep solving arithmetic when the cues were removed. These systems do.
The “it’s about the people” point also cuts the wrong way. In Clever Hans, experts were convinced until adversarial controls were applied. With LLMs, the more adversarial the evaluation gets, the clearer the internal structure becomes. The failure modes sharpen. You start seeing confidence calibration errors, missing constraints, reasoning depth limits, and brittleness under distribution shift. Those are not illusions created by observers. They’re properties of the system under stress.
You’re also glossing over a key asymmetry. Hans never generalized. He didn’t get better at new tasks with minor scaffolding. He didn’t improve when the problem was decomposed. He didn’t degrade gracefully as difficulty increased. LLMs do all of these things, and in ways that correlate with architectural changes and training regimes. That’s not how self-deception looks. That’s how systems with internal representations behave.
I’ll be blunt but polite here: invoking Clever Hans at this stage is not adversarial rigor, it’s a reflex. It’s what you reach for when something feels too capable to be comfortable but you don’t have a concrete failure mechanism to point at. Engineers don’t stop at “people can be fooled.” They ask “what happens when I remove the channel that could be doing the fooling?” That experiment has already been run.
If your claim is “LLMs are unreliable for certain classes of problems,” that’s true and boring. If your claim is “this is all an illusion caused by human pattern-matching,” then you need to explain why the illusion survives automated checks, blind evaluation, distribution shift, and tool-mediated execution. Until then, the Hans analogy isn’t skeptical. It’s nostalgic.