zlacker

Huh? Pixels haven't had 3.5 jacks since Pixel 2 in 2017. wdym? GrapheneOS is exclusive to Pixels because no other device has the same security features like bootloader relocking.

>>hexago+(OP)
2017? Maybe I'm getting old... Still, the point stands — the lack of a 3.5mm jack drives techy users away, and the Pixels just aren't very good for their price range today.

> GrapheneOS is exclusive to Pixels because no other device has the same security features like bootloader relocking.

Sure, because they picked a set of features exclusive to Pixels. Nothing is stopping them from being more permissive about the security features they require.

I do understand why they chose to stick to Pixels; I think it was a mistake nonetheless.

>>hexago+(OP)
The 3a, 4a, and 4a 5G had a headphone jack.

>>648483+P
> Nothing is stopping them from being more permissive

Except for the fact that they don't want to be permissive to keep on being secure.

>>648483+P
> Sure, because they picked a set of features exclusive to Pixels.

No, we don't do that. The security requirements are not exclusive to Pixels. Samsung flagships with an Exynos or MediaTek SoC have nearly every feature listed at https://grapheneos.org/faq#future-devices. They don't quite have proper updates and quality of implementation is an issue. If Samsung allowed us to properly support their devices, we would likely be supported a few Samsung devices. There are no other devices with a reasonable level of security combined with support for using another OS available for us to support. We've also made sure to keep the required support time at 5 years instead of 7 to allow for non-Pixel devices. Snapdragon still not supporting hardware memory tagging at this point is embarrassing for Qualcomm and it should be expected that it's supported at this point, especially since even MediaTek has it now. The OEM making that and other security features available is also needed.

> Nothing is stopping them from being more permissive about the security features they require.

It would not have our core feature set and comparable protections. It would not protect users from real world adversaries like Cellebrite and NSO in the way that it does right now. Our security requirements exist for a reason and major parts of GrapheneOS are built around hardware-based security features. If the device doesn't have hardware memory tagging, then how can we provide one of our main flagship features?

> I do understand why they chose to stick to Pixels; I think it was a mistake nonetheless.

It's strange that you keep mentioning this in the past tense. We support Pixels because they're currently the only devices providing our security requirements while permitting us to use them. If Samsung started permitting us to support their devices, we could support certain Samsung devices. There aren't currently any other devices meeting our requirements, but there isn't a reason to think that there won't be in the future. Our list of security requirements is a very reasonable list of industry standard features. Android OEMs largely aren't trying to provide reasonably secure devices and are not trying to compete with Pixels and iPhones on security. Samsung is an exception, but quality of implementation isn't as high and they're ruining the end result with the massive non-security changes they make that's massively expanding attack surface and making updates much harder.

>>hexago+(OP)
See https://grapheneos.org/faq#future-devices for the official list of security requirements. We've gone out of the way to keep them very reasonable to permit non-Pixel devices such as only requiring 5 years of updates rather than 7. We also don't require pKVM for virtualization to permit SoC vendors using their own proprietary hypervisors. It's a very reasonable list of requirements. Samsung has devices like their current generation flagship tablets meeting nearly all the security requirements. The blocker is Samsung not permitting another OS to properly support their devices including crippling security for them. The blocker isn't that there aren't devices providing the security features we need but that those devices don't allow us to support them. We aren't interested in low security devices like the Fairphone without even the basic security features included and with significant delays even for the security patch backports from the beginning.

If Samsung had allowed a non-stock OS to properly support devices like Samsung Galaxy Tab S10+ and Samsung Galaxy Tab S10 Ultra, we'd have been very interested. They did not allow it. They permanently cripple their devices if you unlock them. People should criticize Samsung for this rather than criticizing us for something we don't control. Companies like Fairphone are not realistically capable of building what we need due to lack of resources so there's little point in people bothering them about it.

>>hexago+(OP)
>bootloader relocking

My OnePlus3 (2017-ish?) can do that.

It's not even a feature, but standard android bootloader will do this much. Vendors deliberately remove such features, if not disable phone unlocking outright[0].

0. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bootloader_unlocking

>>snvzz+T6
Qualcomm offers the feature as an option to every OEM using Snapdragon. Our understanding is that it costs extra money to license, like many of their features including security features. Snapdragon is immensely expensive for a modern flagship SoC with long term support and the full feature set including security features.

OnePlus supported it on several devices but then removed it in updates fixing serious security vulnerabilities. Their non-stock verified boot support was insecure and instead of fixing it they removed it. It's likely there wasn't a clear or possible way to fix it due having a poor implementation which never worked properly. Fairphone 4 had a completely insecure implementation of verified boot trusting publicly available AOSP test keys. Having support for it really doesn't mean it works or will even keep appearing to work in future updates.

It's also just one feature. Our overall hardware security requirements are listed at https://grapheneos.org/faq#future-devices. People focus too much on relocking the device but we require a lot more than that. There are non-Pixel devices with essentially all the features we require such as the Samsung Galaxy S10+ and S10 Ultra but they don't allow using another OS without losing the security features. The updates are also still not what we expect, but if Samsung actually make it possible to support their devices we could accept some compromises. On the other hand, supporting far less secure devices missing things we consider hard requirements like memory tagging needed to provide our core feature set doesn't interest us.

>>648483+P
> Sure, because they picked a set of features exclusive to Pixels. Nothing is stopping them from being more permissive about the security features they require.

You're not the target audience for this OS. Strong security guarantees require vertical integration.

>>snvzz+T6
The oneplus3 cannot be relocked as it wrongly trusts test-keys. It also has public EDL firehose files available allowing anyone to flash it arbitrarily even when locked or further dump ram or userdata.

I previously documented this here: https://web.archive.org/web/20250120181249/https://divestos....