zlacker

Thanks for the links, the "tradeoff" aspect of paraconsistent logic is interesting. I think one way to achieve consensus with your debate partner might be to consider that the language rep is "just" a nondeterministic decompression of "the facts". I'm primed to agree with you but

>>41892090

(It's very common, esp. with educationally traumatized Americans, e.g., to identify Math with "calculation"/"approved tools" and not "the concepts")

"No amount of calculation will model conceptual thinking" <- sounds more reasonable?? (You said you were ok with nondeterministic outputs? :)

Sorry to come across as patronizing

>>gsf_em+(OP)
if conceptual thinking is manipulating abstract concepts after having been given concrete particulars, I'd say it relies heavily upon projection, which, as generalised "K" (from SKI), sounds awfully like calculation.

>>082349+Ua
And this is why I think gibson1 is wrong: we can argue about which projections or systems of logic should be used, concepts are still "calculations".

>>csdvrx+EP1
Here is why I think Gibson could in principle still be right (without necessarily summoning religious feelings)

[if we disregard that he said "concepts are key" -- though we can be yet more charitable and assume that he doesn't accept (median) human-level intelligence as the final boss]

  Para-doxxing ">" Under-standing

(I haven't thought this through, just vibe-calculating, as it were, having pondered the necessity of concrete particulars for a split-second)

(More on that "sophistiKated" aspect of "projeKtion": turns out not to be as idiosynKratic as I'd presumed, but I traded bandwidth for immediacy here, so I'll let GP explain why that's interesting, if he indeed finds it is :)

Wolfram (selfstyled heir to Leibniz/Galois) seems to be serving himself a fronthanded compliment:

https://writings.stephenwolfram.com/2020/12/combinators-a-ce...

>What I called a “projection” then is what we’d call a function now; a “filter” is what we’d now call an argument )