zlacker

Exactly. Ideally, we'd all follow the Benzite approach, which is to withhold any and all information from one's peers until a complete analysis has finished, and the best possible remedy to the problem has already been applied. Because how can a miscreant use a vulnerability if it hasn't even been published yet?

As contributors, we enjoy a lot of trust, as we should. That's why it's not a problem if we make seemingly random changes that don't necessarily make a lot of sense, but seem relevant to security, when they actually fix an issue in the code. After all, it's necessary to prevent bad guys from gaining sensitive information, and to keep your colleagues from being unduly bothered with challenges they could possibly help with.

>>evujum+(OP)
Miscreants have a history of independently discovering vulnerabilities. Software vendors have a history of not fixing security issues. The current coordiated disclosure with a deadline forces vendors to fix their flaws while also allowing users to work around unfixed flaws.