zlacker

Storing the passkeys on a device protected by a PIN is an option too. Example: T2F2-PIN+ Release3 by Token2 can store 300 passkeys.

>>MaKey+(OP)
That's a fair point, although as the PIN is validated locally, you could argue from the server perspective you gain a second (knowledge) factor, but from a local perspective it's entirely correlated with the existing stored factor (a weakness in the local device implementation can skip that PIN check and yield the result).

Perhaps this is excessive, but it's a model where I like to see layers of security that depend on different, uncorrelated failures being required to bypass them.

Today if you want to get into an account using "FIDO2 as MFA" you need both the account credentials or ability to reach the Fido prompt (say password reset), and the hardware token device (with optional pin). The device alone being compromised shouldn't get you into the account.