zlacker

Arguably a much, much bigger problem are the (many) microphones of modern devices.

These usually get neither an LED nor a switch, and unlike cameras can't easily be covered, nor pointed away from potentially sensitive topics/subjects.

>>lxgr+(OP)
No amount of microphones will ever be a bigger problem than a single compromising photo or video.

>>paxys+n
Then you're lacking fantasy.

For example, I'd not be happy having my voice auto-transcribed by some malware as I authenticate to my bank providing my SSN etc (which as an authentication method is of course horribly insecure, but that's a different discussion).

Of course, this will vary from person to person, but as mentioned above, just being able to mechanically cover a camera when required makes it less of an issue for me.

>>paxys+n
I can’t think of much if anything which would be a compromising photo or video from my laptop, but conversations certainly are.

>>paxys+n
A photo may be merely embarrassing. You could get a lot of immediately useful information hearing my phone calls though.

>>lxgr+(OP)
At the same time we're at a point where synthesizing your voice is getting more trivial everyday, you need only a few seconds of it and you can be made to say whatever someone wants.

>>paxys+n
I am dying for a compromising photo/video leak - I’ll finally be able to convince my wife to start OF channel :)

>>8f2ab3+U3
Sure, but that doesn’t mean they learn everything I said: Passwords, personal details etc.

Also, getting a voice sample in the first place gets significantly easier that way: Not everybody publishes video or audio recordings of themselves online.

>>lxgr+(OP)
>These usually get neither an LED nor a switch

Lots of ThinkPads have «Microphone is muted» LED. Not exactly what's requested (and is bound to a software mute/unmute shortcut), but it's better than nothing regarding state of machine being observable with a quick glance.

>>lxgr+k9
> Passwords

Which reminds me, to strengthen your point, it doesn't have 100% keystroke recognition, but there are works[1] on keylogging via audio, and 93% via Zoom-quality audio streams is concerning enough for me.

[1] https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.01074

>>lxgr+m1
I'm with you. I can recover from nudes of me being on the Internet. That night even help me filter out friends that aren't really friends.

If someone drains my accounts, I'm definitely screwed.

>>throwa+6b
That one seems to be software controlled. I'm fairly sure I remember having the mic working with the mute LED lit, which was confusing. That was on a x1 carbon gen9.

>>mkj+Mf
Correct, its usefulness depends on software working as expected (and not being tampered with)

    echo 1 | sudo tee /sys/devices/platform/thinkpad_acpi/leds/platform\:\:micmute/brightness 

is enough to turn the LED on without muting the mic.

>>lxgr+(OP)
And having a microphone in the same chassis as the keyboard would make creating a keylogger easier. A microphone in the same room as the keyboard can be made into a keylogger[1].

[1] <https://github.com/shoyo/acoustic-keylogger>

>>Loughl+Zc
>>If someone drains my accounts, I'm definitely screwed.

You ring your bank and it's reversed almost instantly. Your photos on the internet you have no way of doing anything about them, they are there forever.

>>paxys+n
In most business environments it's the opposite.

>>lxgr+(OP)
One can do whatever to one's computer, it doesn't matter if one is still carrying a microphone in one's pocket the whole day and sleeping next to it too.

>>paxys+n
If an attacker is at the point where they can turn on your microphone, or video, it doesn't really matter anymore, it's been game over for a long time.

This never really registered to me, before a former colleague commented on the nonsense with people putting tape over their camera. If an attacker has access to your camera, or microphone, then they have access to pretty much very thing else. The difference in damage is negligible, it's already total for most.

If people are truly concerned about the camera in their laptop, then keep the computer in a dedicate room, shut it down when your done (or close the lid, if it's a laptop).

Sure it's kinda dumb that the LED is software controlled and that there's not a physical switch for turning off the microphone, but even having those things done correct doesn't negate the amount of damage someone could do with they have that kind of access to your devices.

>>gambit+n51
Not to downplay the ramification, especially to a young person, but the leak of photos are a passing thing and it's quickly forgotten. Afterwards you're pretty immune, what are they going to do, leak the photos again?

A young Danish woman had nude photos leaked by an old boyfriend. She had her friend take better pictures and posted those herself so now no one can find the original photos. Not suggesting that as a solution, but I thought it was a pretty fun response.

>>mrweas+Qr1
> If an attacker is at the point where they can turn on your microphone, or video, it doesn't really matter anymore, it's been game over for a long time.

This is obviously incorrect.

There is lots of software that can get access to your camera/microphone but not have access to anything else, like browser-based applications. And on Mac even locally installed applications are limited; getting access to user data directories requires a separate permission grant from webcam access.

You might also simply have nothing incriminating on your machine.