There's no doubt Ilya is highly respected in the field, but not to the same extent as Albert Einstein is in physics.
Maybe with time, but certainly not today.
mirror: https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/7nORLckDnmg (1m 15s)
But you have a good point. Ilya got us so much closer to AGI, but he might not like the results now.
In fact, his arguments against nonlocality were later disproven experimentally in the '80s, as quantum mechanics allowed for much higher fidelity predictions than could be explained by a hidden variable theory [0].
I don't think anyone _likes_ the Copenhagen interpretation per se, it's just the least objectionable choice (if you have to make one at all). Many-worlds sounds cool and all until you realize that it's essentially impossible to verify experimentally, and at that point you're discussing philosophy and what-if more than physics.
Intuition only gets you as far as the accuracy of your mental model. Is it intuitive that the volume enclosed by the unit hypersphere approaches zero [1] as its dimensions go to infinity? Or that photons have momentum, but no mass? Or you can draw higher-dimension Venn diagrams with sectors that have negative area? If these all make intuitive sense to you, I'm jealous that your intuition extends further than mine.
Copenhagen, on the other hand, doesn’t offer a workable model of how and when the wave function collapses, and doesn’t offer any predictions in that way (there are theories of wave function collapse that actually make predictions — some of which have already been falsified by experiment). For that reason Copenhagen isn’t “least objectionable”.
Copenhagen is basically an admission that we have no good intuition for why QM behaves the way it does, and wavefunction collapse is merely a way of justifying existing observations within the framework of QM.
IMO all the discussion about how wavefunction collapse doesn't scale to larger ensembles of particles, or the boundary between QM and Newtonian mechanics being ill-defined is noise -- the bridge between the two is statistical mechanics, where classical mechanics only arises from sufficiently large macrostates such that you can aggregate out any quantum mechanical properties. And QM is generally understood to be a toy model in the same way that Newtonian mechanics is a toy model -- it's useful in the realm where we use it, but when you push beyond the limits of that realm, its deficiencies become apparent.
That's why I don't think the proposed experiments to test many-worlds are particularly meaningful (since AFAIK they all seem to involve performing interference on enormous ensembles on the scale of entire humans) -- it's well beyond the limits of where QM is useful (also, I personally don't think we'll ever be able to operate quantum-mechanically at that scale).