zlacker

I'm not clear why people are poo-pooing this as if it's not a big deal. From a security and espionage point of view this is pretty significant - the audio learning has got to the point that a sensitive audio bug can bascially be key logger. There are a ton of context where an audio tap would be much easier to get in place than a traditional network attack (and with modern shotgun mics, might not even require being in the building). That is applicable to much more than just password stealing.

I've always been a bit fascinated by this attack vector and wondered if would get to this point.

>>iainct+(OP)
Yes it seems like any possible physical side channel (eg Tempest as well) is now amenable to machine learning approaches. Very interesting indeed.

>>iainct+(OP)
you would need to tie microphone input with the actual keys typed, and enough of it to train a model. nothingburger

>>iainct+(OP)
I wonder if playing the typing sound constantly could help. Not an abstract sound, but recording of your actual typing on this particular keyboard, mixed to play some realistic-sounding phrases / sequences. It should pause for a split second to let your actual keystrokes mix in. That would be really hard to decipher, or to correlate your typing with whatever other events (time to enter a password).

Better yet, play some white noise around you. I heard that it's actually done sometimes at really important meetings.

If you're not such a VIP, just type important things only on your phone; touch screens don't produce enough sound, hopefully.