zlacker

Except when they do matter, like the Therac-25 deaths or those 737 MAX crashes.

>>crooke+(OP)
> 737 MAX crashes

To imply this was a software bug is a pretty silly representation - the system was poorly engineered and didn't have proper contingencies for sensor disagreement. This is pretty clearly a design/engineering error with a software component.

Besides, the guy said "rarely ever matter" for a reason, not "explicitly never impact things"... Bit of a silly comment from you IMO

>>nawgz+e1
To view software in isolation is an equally silly representation. In the physical world, software is part of an overall system that needs to be considered holistically. Most major safety-critical mishaps are the result of several failures, often across different domains.

In the case of the 737MAX, the software was a design around a physical constraint; that doesn't mean the software doesn't matter. Most software is designed as a workaround of a certain physical or mental constraint.

>>crooke+(OP)
If you're referring to MCAS in 737, the software itself wasn't the main problem; I'd say that the main problem was that it wasn't even a documented feature (let alone the engineering of the system itself).

The pilot couldn't even turn MCAS off originally. That's not a software thing, that's a "who the F designed this" thing.