Neither of those require attestation.
>Look at the invasive software mechanisms that games use for “anti-cheat” if you want to see one possible eventuality.
A future where people can't cheat when playing with me is a positive direction to take computing.
>This is “Right to Read” territory we’re walking into.
I assume you are talking about "The Right to Read" by RMS. It is already illegal to redistribute ebooks if you don't have the rights to do so. We already live in that world. Unlike the essay as an industry we have chosen to focus on hardware based security instead of making debuggers illegal.
Any assumption the client is "trustworthy" requires attestation. I was certainly being hyperbolic with my examples. Using a more concrete example of, say, a device's camera and LIDAR claiming a living human is interacting w/ the device would require software and hardware attestation with a chain of trust extending to the camera and LIDAR hardware. Without that one could connect emulated inputs to those devices and game the system.
> A future where people can't cheat when playing with me is a positive direction to take computing.
I agree, provided that the architecture of the anti-cheat relies on that infrastructure happening server-side. Any architecture that requires the client to be "trustworthy" requires attestation and runs afoul of freedom.
I think having anti-cheat is a poor trade off for user freedom on personal computers.
> I assume you are talking about "The Right to Read" by RMS. ... we have chosen to focus on hardware based security instead of making debuggers illegal.
You can make a literal interpretation if you'd like. My takeaway from "The Right to Read" is a cautionary tale about architectures of control being used to remove user freedom. That rings true to me irrespective of the mechanism employed in the story, or even that it deals with ebooks specifically. That Stallman didn't think about tamper-resistant hardware, e-fuses, and key material locked up in embedded processors doesn't change the message of the story.
Sure, but that sounds useful.
>Any architecture that requires the client to be "trustworthy" requires attestation and runs afoul of freedom.
Okay, but I would give up freedom if it means there are no cheaters. Not all cheats can be detected server side. The cost of stopping name cheats server side is more expensive to do than stopping them client side. If the cost of anticheat is cheaper it means that games can be developed for cheaper incentivizing more and higher quality games to be made.