zlacker

That's the point of this framing - it's pitching the device manufacturer as an attacker and Secure Enclave as their sinister fortress inside your device. This is an age-old argument against these systems, but to your point the conspiracy theory crumbles at the edges once you start trying to turn it into a threat model.

>>bri3d+(OP)
Yeah, I get the point, it's just a terrible framing because, as you said, this threat model is nonsensical.

It's just that this description is describing an "attack" that is just how attestation works. If you have a problem with attestation, talk about that problem, calling it "an attack" does nothing.

I'm actually against the proposal, too - although I see the merits. The ability to have servers authenticate clients based on the context of that client is amazing - it would seriously improve security if done right. But I personally believe that this should be done through the Device Policy extension exclusively, as it is already done there today, and that the extension should be opened and standardized.

In fact, I believe Google should be forced to do so.