zlacker

Named providers...

Reuters CLEAR has no clear opt out and is being sold as "prevention" (precog). https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/products/clear-investiga...

LexisNexis https://optout.lexisnexis.com/

Exactis has no clear opt out. https://www.exactis.com/about-us/

PeekYou https://www.peekyou.com/about/contact/ccpa_optout/do_not_sel...

>>contin+(OP)
Are the opt outs worth it? I don't see the benefit of giving them my real name, my info and telling them to delete it if they figured out it was me. Would it be easier to just change your name every once in a while legally?

>>graphe+J4
Not sure what the play is here. By changing your name you are telling the government about your new name. So they will just search for all of your names.

>>graphe+J4
Isn’t a name change just another entry in a database saying user_id X now points to make Y?

How hard can it be to combine one more database entry into a deanonymisation process?

>>janals+va
Good luck looking though all the John Smiths. If the government can fuck up because they didn't check Firefox instead of internet explorer I'm hoping there's little human errors that will make it harder. I'm sure they have electronics checks but I'm sure there's human error too.

>>graphe+jc
Probably in many countries there could be a sketchy but still potentially viable process of changing your DOB, for example by attesting to incorrect original documentation by various corruptible authorities and presenting such to other authorities (eg. claiming an off-by-one on month or day). This may be more effective in conjunction with name change as it pretty much removes the major de-duplicating factor in most government identification schemes.