I think its a growing issue, as they mature/migrate their older code base, issues become less frequent.
- require admin rights (which means that if they have vulnerabilities, it can take control of the entire machine, even if Firefox itself is sanboxed);
- monkey-patch the Firefox executable in memory, which works (when it does) as long as the version of the software tracks closely the version of Firefox, which may or may not be the case;
- ... and also decreases the memory-safety of Firefox, which makes it easier to pwn;
- ... and also makes the crash reports unreliable;
- install encryption certificates that are actually less trustworthy than Mozilla's, hence decreasing the security of https;
- block Firefox and add-on security updates, also decreasing security;
- install privileged add-ons, many of which are easy to exploit from any webpage;
- ...
Part of the work on Crash Scene Investigations was attempting to determine whether the crash was in Firefox or in code or in some bogus foreign code. Depressingly often, it was the latter.
In your case, it's entirely possible that malwarebytes was simply untested on Firefox.
This one was a frustratingly common cause of crashes when I worked in gamedev. So many crashes would end up being some overlay or antivirus monkeying about with memory.
This has long been a leaky part of Windows security. If your malware can get its code running inside a highly privileged service or process, it can do more or less whatever it wants to the rest of the system. But even when not used for nefarious purposes, it is still an extremely dangerous capability in that it can be very easy to create problems .
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/p...
...and DRM.
Makes me wonder: Does windows Defender just double as another deliberate NSA backdoor?
The same is valid for Apple, Google, and every other US company.
Recent versions of Firefox allow you to block some stuff like that: https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/identify-problems-third...
Though it's possible they use different code injection tricks to make blocking impossible. (You can't block Defender from listening to events for example)
Given that in many industries insurances and, in some cases like banking, the law requires companies to monitor HTTPS traffic of browsers for compliance, it might be better if browsers had a dedicated filter / monitor API.
Whether this provides any meaningful security is questionable unless you pair it with filesystem isolation to prevent malicious programs from modifying config files / bashrc / etc. Meanwhile it does make legit uses of ptrace more annoying.
[0] https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/security/Yama.txt
Firefox itself is at 4-5% and the whole machine is at 14%
Normal Firefox was also fine last I used it.
A shockingly large number of crashes and performance issues in PC gaming are related to poorly behaved overlay programs and overclocking tools like RivaTuner, Overwolf, and the Discord Overlay. I'd well believe your points.