zlacker

All Microsoft need to do to block other operating systems from PCs is change their policy around secure boot. All they need to do to prevent unsigned apps from running is change the default behaviour of Windows. The code exists. It's deployed. It's commonly available.

>>mjg59+(OP)
They need to boil the frog slowly enough that most people won't realise until it's too late.

>>mjg59+(OP)
Pluton will likely close OEM/firmware security holes that could be used to escape such policy.

>>userbi+B
I don't think that analogy works here, since the things we're worried about are binary states. Either you can run arbitrary software, or you can not, etc.

>>mjg59+(OP)
Yup, it's that close. I'm honestly happy there's an outrage ahead of releases of chips like that. Some systems did get secureboot locked down. Maybe we get the policy we got exactly because people are still outraged.

I'll take that any day over ms+Intel releasing a t2-equivalent + SB combo as required in all new certified laptops and people realising too late.

>>Karuna+22
Perhaps a better analogy then is securing the noose around the neck of the prisoner, but not yet releasing the trapdoor.

>>transp+81
Via what mechanisms? Nothing we currently know about Pluton would enable it to do anything like that, as far as I can tell.

>>mjg59+F3
not much detail, but slide 12 claims: https://www.platformsecuritysummit.com/2019/speaker/seay/PSE...

> Pluton validates and boots Security Monitor

> Security Monitor validates and boots the Linux Kernel

> Application Signatures are verified by SM and Pluton before Linux Kernel loads an application

>>transp+s6
This design still relies on prior stages of the boot process handing stuff over to Pluton - if there are vulnerabilities in the OEM firmware, they're still going to be exploitable in this model.

>>dane-p+43
...and the people who work on "progressing" this technology are helping to make the nooses better and also putting them on their own necks. (I've used that analogy before. I think it's a great one.)