zlacker

There are very few threat models that a memory unsafe parser does not break.

Even the "unskilled attacker trying other people's vulns" threat basically depends on the existence of memory-safety related vulnerabilities.

>>kmeist+(OP)
Then we’re right back in the checklist mentality of “500 things secure apps never do”. I could talk to somebody else and they’d tell me the real threat to worry about is phishing or poor CI/CD or insecure passwords or whatever.

>>blowsk+K5
There is no "real threat". Definitely phishing is one of the top threats to an organization, left unmitigated. Thankfully, we now have unphishable 2FA, so you can mitigate it. When you choose to prioritize a threat is going to be a call you have to make as the owner of your company's security posture - maybe phishing is above memory safety for you, I can't say.

What I can say is that parsing untrusted data in C is very risky. I can't say it is more risky than phishing for you, or more risky than anything else. I lack the context to do so.

That said, a really easy solution might be to just not do that. Just like... don't parse untrusted input in C. If that's hard for you, so be it, again I lack context. But that's my general advice - don't do it.

>>static+57
In-arguable these days.