zlacker

You could try to do a more difficult hash or something (bcrypt maybe?) but I don't know if it's a very good idea. I think you'd spike your latency, open yourself to DoS attacks or only minorly inconvenience anyone reversing the hashes, or some combination of those.

>>kadoba+(OP)
>(bcrypt maybe?) but I don't know if it's a very good idea

b/scrypt and all other password grade hashes are slow on purpose but they are slow per each use. Imagine the processing takes 0.1s (which is on the low side of hardness) per each request - you just killed all your servers w/o any designated DoS. If you abandon the nonce and use the same salt multiple times (so the computation is amortized), it'd take a replicated cache of IP->hash and even then it still doesn't accomplish much...