zlacker

>It's not like researchers are "engineering a virus to do exactly what they want it to do", what they do is observe the evolution of cultures of viruses, in an environment that's conductive to it, to see where that ultimately leads.

No, I think some researchers are trying to do that. From the article you linked:

>In an article published in Nature Medicine1 on 9 November, scientists investigated a virus called SHC014, which is found in horseshoe bats in China. The researchers created a chimaeric virus, made up of a surface protein of SHC014 and the backbone of a SARS virus that had been adapted to grow in mice and to mimic human disease. The chimaera infected human airway cells — proving that the surface protein of SHC014 has the necessary structure to bind to a key receptor on the cells and to infect them.

This isn't merely observing viruses in a lab environment. It's combining parts of different viruses to create a new, more effective virus. This is gain of function research, and there's an allegation that SARS-CoV-2 may have been created in a similar way.

>Sure, an argument can be made how that's one way of how we could end up creating and releasing such a virus ourselves, but even then: Wouldn't it be preferable for that to happen in a controlled research environment, instead of it just emerging in some remote obscure place? At least then are in a way better position to understand why and how it happens, giving us an edge in fighting it.

Let's hypothetically assume SARS-CoV-2 was created through either this lab-monitoring method and/or gain of function methods. (Not saying it was or even that it's likely; just for the sake of argument.)

Would that adjust your stance towards the risks?