zlacker

I think the argument would be that with end-to-end encryption this is unnecessary, which is good because it's impossible.

There's a counter-argument that there is still useful metadata a server can glean from its users, but it's certainly minimised with a good protocol... like the Signal protocol.

>>danpal+(OP)
Wait, how would end-to-end encryption help this problem at all? I agree that it is impossible (currently), but not sure how E2E helps anything?

E2E encryption only helps you verify WHO you are connecting to, not what they are doing with your connection once it is established.

>>cortes+ft
Because it doesn't matter what the server does in terms of message content.

>>cortes+ft
Because the other end in E2E is your friend's phone, not a server. We call end-to-server encryption "in-flight" encryption.

>>iudqno+H51
Ah, ok I misunderstood