If a bio research lab is accidentally allowing the public to come in contact with anything it is studying, this is something we need to
1. investigate
2. identify
3. prevent
Saying "it's possible this could have happened anyway" is not meaningful. I would prefer we identify how it did happen. If a lab leaked it, this would inform future discussions on what lab practices and research projects have acceptable risk/reward.
Ignoring the possibility this leaked from a lab until you have bulletproof evidence is nonsensical, particularly when investigator access is restricted. This, more than anything, is the point the article is making. Lab containment failures have a well documented history.
RaTG13 is the closest virus found in the wild to SARS-CoV-2. Samples of it were shipped to the Wuhan lab, which does so-called "gain of function research"--AKA experimenting with artificially sped up mutation rates. Not very long thereafter, SARS-CoV-2 shows up in the surrounding metropolitan area with a very, very similar genome. They're the nearest siblings on the phylogenetic tree.
It's only politics which keep people from calling this the smoking gun it really is.
> "Decades" worth of mutations can happen in a single immune-compromised host in a matter of weeks.
SARS-CoV-2 has been circulating for a year now. The number of mutations it has undergone is a tiny fraction of the number of mutations separating RaTG13 and SARS-CoV-2.
> fwiw I'd love a source for that "decades" claim.
A paper in Nature Microbiology estimates the most recent common ancestor of RaTG13 and SARS-CoV-2 to be in the 1960s. The latest possible time of divergence is 2000.[1]
> RaTG13 is the closest virus found in the wild to SARS-CoV-2. Samples of it were shipped to the Wuhan lab, which does so-called "gain of function research"--AKA experimenting with artificially sped up mutation rates.
First of all, gain-of-function does not mean "artificially sped-up mutation rates." It normally refers to specific, targeted changes to the genome, done in order to test a particular hypothesis. What you're describing is a type of experiment never done before: passaging a virus thousands of times in order to generate a massively different virus. This would be an massively time- and labor-intensive experiment, with no apparent motivation.
Second of all, RaTG13 has never been isolated. It exists as fragments of RNA in a fecal swab. Its genome has been reconstructed from sequences of RNA samples, but actually extracting a replicating virus from a fecal swab is a major undertaking. To date, the WIV has only isolated three SARS-related coronaviruses, all of them much closer to the original SARS than to SARS-CoV-2. Before 2020, nobody cared much about viruses that are 20% different from the original SARS. If you read papers from the WIV before 2020, they're all about viruses like WIV-1, which is closely related to the original SARS.
The lab in question was sent tissue samples extracted from the miners who died of RaTG13. These presumably would have live virus on them.
However, the miners' story shows you why virologists consider natural zoonosis overwhelmingly likely. Miners, people who raise livestock, butchers, and millions of other people throughout China are in close contact with possibly infected animals every day. Spillover events are probably not uncommon: it's estimated that most (about 95%, in the countryside) spillover events of SARS-CoV-2-like viruses do not cause sustained outbreaks.[2] A few people get sick, and then the virus dead-ends. The virus' best chance is if someone who's infected travels to a major population center, where the virus has a higher chance of spreading. The virus' chance of survival is estimated to increase to about 30%, in that case.
1. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2951-z
2. https://science.sciencemag.org/content/early/2021/03/17/scie...