zlacker

A reasonable BOD can ameliorate any of the downsides with a (C)(6) quite easily, and while the perception may linger, it's entirely possible and likely that the Foundation will serve the Rust community regardless of whatever legal structure they choose. There are plenty of reasons to avoid (C)(3)s as well if you do want to fund the project with corporate dollars since those contributions are usually routed through an organization's philanthropic arm and usually can't be approved by business unit owners. (C)(3)s also have more stringent reporting requirements which can be a nice 'check' on any abuses but usually result in a lot more overhead.

>>mikeyo+(OP)
I've served on a non-profit board (the Apache Software Foundation, which is a 501(c)(3)), and I don't believe that counting on the composition of the board to maintain independence would be reliable. Board members come and go. If you care about independence, it should be baked into the corporate structure.

It is true that it is more difficult to get funds for a 501(c)(3) than a 501(c)(6). That forces the organization to operate lean and constrains possible initiatives (e.g. funding development), but also serves as a buffer against influence.

Paradoxically, a maximally independent organization may serve the interests of the long tail of potential corporate donors, because they don't have to worry that the biggest player in their space will capture it via pay-to-play.

(For those not up on the acronym, BOD stands for Board Of Directors in this context.)

>>rectan+E2
Yeah, no arguments here, all fair points. I guess my point is that the Rust folks may have good reasons to pursue a (c)(6) and I don't think it says much about the future of the project if they go that route. With forethought, you can engineer the board and management structure to really be technology focused and provide in-built protection from 'corporatization' of the project.