zlacker

All typical attacks on Tor are known for many years already. If you follow the advises from the Tor website, it will be very hard (nearly impossible) to find you. What do you mean by "quite easy"?

>>fsflov+(OP)
By quite easy i mean, when you have global surveillance in place. All tor-nodes are public all tor-exits are public, if your system can track connections from one node to another node and then the exit-node everything is clear.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance#Infiltrati...

Edit: And that from netzpolitik (highly trusted german source) under 'A global passive adversary' that's the interesting part: https://netzpolitik.org/2017/secret-documents-reveal-german-...

>>nix23+n1
It is enough to have at least a few independent relays to cover the trace. Everyone who can should be running a relay node at home I guess. Also we generally need more participants in Tor of course.

There is also I2P network, which is even harder to break (unless someone owns practically all nodes there).

>>fsflov+6b
Well i run a node (not exit) and yes it's better then nothing, but to fully trust Tor is a big nono, i said nothing else. Protections from private company or country's yes..but protection from GCHQ/NSA probably not.

And no you can trace it thru the ISP's, the problem is the latency, Connection from here to there in that millisecond trace one...and so on.

>>nix23+Tf
If you are speaking about the timing attack, then you should consider I2P. It makes them significantly harder. In general, I agree that if your enemy is NSA, you can do very little. But you can make their life harder, and you should.

>>fsflov+Ag
I2P is absolutely great, a shame that it's no covered so much and Freenet was once also a cool project...i see we are on the same page ;)

Edit: GnuNet, RetroShare and ZeroNet should also be mentioned