zlacker

Is what you're describing essentially a trust anchor / root of trust, as implemented in TPMs? I realize that TPMs aren't implemented exactly as you describe, but they are designed to be vulnerable only to physical attack, not software attack.

I ignored the (negative) hype and looked into TPMs recently, and I encourage others to do the same.[0] They look like excellent solutions with the important exception that two of the three key hierarchies, the platform hierarchy and endorsement hierarchy, appear to be fundamentally in the vendor's and not in my control (the latter hierarchy can be disabled, as I understand it, but its functionality is then lost). It's surprising that enterprise IT would tolerate that - I'm not sure I will - but perhaps they can have the manufacturer deploy the corporation's keys in the roots of those hierarchies.

Also, the TPM's security as a trust anchor depends on its implementation. They look good in theory, but I have no idea if the various vendors actually implement them effectively.

[0] By far the best source I found is A Practical Guide to TPM 2.0 - Using the Trusted Platform Module in the New Age of Security by Arthur, Challener. It's also recommended by the Trusted Computing Group, the authors of TPM.

>>hackus+(OP)
You're getting the idea. The difference is that what I described leaned more toward replaceable, open hardware and user control of process than TPM. The TPM scheme was designed fairly well for industry project but is meant to include lowest cost, DRM, and software stack.