zlacker

[parent] [thread] 3 comments
1. semi-e+(OP)[view] [source] 2017-02-28 05:52:13
> still doesn't protect you against (...) malware written by people who have SSL MITM proxies in mind

Exactly this is what I don't get. Since these abominations are becoming ubiquitous, surely malware writers are starting to work on workarounds? And in this case, it's as easy as setting up an SSH tunnel and running your malware traffic through that, which is a few days of work at best for a massive ROI?

replies(2): >>wildmu+L >>cesarb+jk
2. wildmu+L[view] [source] 2017-02-28 06:03:25
>>semi-e+(OP)
Depending on the threat model and how serious you are about locking things down, you might just block all such traffic.
replies(1): >>vidarh+if
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3. vidarh+if[view] [source] [discussion] 2017-02-28 09:41:10
>>wildmu+L
In which case your malware can do DNS lookups against a suitable domain: Just chop your file into suitable sized strings, encode them as suitable hostnames and look up [chunk of file].evilmalwaredomain.com, and soon enough the server handling evilmalwaredomain.com will have the whole file.

Or plain HTTP POSTs with encrypted content. If it reject stuff that looks encrypted, plain HTTP POSTs encoding the binary files by taking a suitably sized file of words and encode it as nonsensical rants to a suitable user-created sub-reddit.

Or e-mails made using the same mechanism.

If you want low latency two way communication doing this can be a bit hard, but you basically have no way of stopping even a generic way of passing data this way unless you only whitelist a tiny set of trusted sites and reject all other network traffic (such as DNS lookups). And keep in mind you can't just lock down client traffic out of the network - you also would need to lock down your servers and filter things like DNS - the above mentioned DNS approach will work even through intermediary recursive resolvers (malware infected desktop => trusted corporate recursive resolver => internet), unless they filter out requests for domains they don't trust.

But basically, if you allow data out, it's almost trivial to find ways to pass data out unless the channel is extremely locked down.

4. cesarb+jk[view] [source] 2017-02-28 10:58:01
>>semi-e+(OP)
Not even malware writers: on the recent Cloudflare incident, there was one password manager which was affected, but the leak was harmless for them because the content within their TLS connections had another layer of encryption. Both MITM proxies and their TLS-terminating CDN can see only encrypted data.
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