Using a computer today requires interoperating with such a bewildering array of other systems. Just writing a web browser is a huge undertaking.
It's wrong to compare Qubes to academic microkernels that require applications written in a formal language. It should be compared to a general Linux/BSD distro or to Windows, because those are the systems it's competing for users with. In comparison to those, it's a much more solid platform for security.
Now, unlike your claim, others were in production under label MILS systems far back as 2005. They used separation kernels to host VM's for Linux and Windows with networking, filesystem, GUI, etc in separate partitions plus color labels on screens. Sound familiar? Additionally, the Turaya work in Europe got turned into commercial products from Sirrix. OKL4's was deployed in a billion phones. Genode's tiny team has made theirs quite usable in short time despite all the custom work done.
So, Qubes wasn't the first, most polished, most secure, least academic, or anything. It's a latecomer using inherently bad components but with high usability and tolerance to regular malware. There's an upper limit to how much security if can provide as malware sophistication and threat model increases. So, I encourage its use only for lower, threat profiles like average user browsing the web with investments into stronger architectures for higher, risk use.
No binaries are distributed for obvious reasons. You can setup a build environment very quickly. It's simple stuff. See the Genode book: http://genode.org/documentation/genode-foundations-16-05.pdf
Oh, check out the rump kernel integration afterwards.
Fyi, package manager integration via Nix is in the works.