zlacker

[return to "I read the federal government’s Zero-Trust Memo so you don’t have to"]
1. static+ua[view] [source] 2022-01-27 15:56:56
>>EthanH+(OP)
This is pretty incredible. These aren't just good practices, they're the fairly bleeding edge best practices.

1. No more SMS and TOTP. FIDO2 tokens only.

2. No more unencrypted network traffic - including DNS, which is such a recent development and they're mandating it. Incredible.

3. Context aware authorization. So not just "can this user access this?" but attestation about device state! That's extremely cutting edge - almost no one does that today.

My hope is that this makes things more accessible. We do all of this today at my company, except where we can't - for example, a lot of our vendors don't offer FIDO2 2FA or webauthn, so we're stuck with TOTP.

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2. meepmo+hD[view] [source] 2022-01-27 18:05:10
>>static+ua
Also, “Password policies must not require use of special characters or regular rotation.”

They even call out the fact that it's a proven bad practice that leads to weaker passwords - and such policies must be gone from government systems in 1 year from publication of the memo. It's delightful.

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3. atulad+9Q[view] [source] 2022-01-27 19:01:22
>>meepmo+hD
Somewhat unrelated, but hopefully this also means TreasuryDirect will get rid of its archaic graphical keyboard that disables the usage of password managers.

(Graphical keyboards are an old technique to try to defeat key loggers. A frequent side effect of a site using a graphical keyboard is that the developer has to make the password input field un-editable directly, which prevents password managers from working, unless you use a user script to make the field editable again.)

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