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1. xvecto+W4[view] [source] 2021-06-05 22:32:49
>>lxm+(OP)
I wish services didn't store IPs at all.

If abuse is an issue, why not hash the IP with a nonce?

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2. kadoba+K5[view] [source] 2021-06-05 22:40:18
>>xvecto+W4
For ipv4 is there a difference between storing IPs and storing their hash with a nonce? You can calculate the hash of every IP address in reasonable time, so it's reversible.

Only benefit I can think of is you can forget the nonce and now the data is securely useless, if the nonce was secure, but that doesn't seem that useful really.

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3. xvecto+Ra[view] [source] 2021-06-05 23:33:26
>>kadoba+K5
I think if we use a difficult enough hash function it should be okay? With 4 billion IPv4 addresses it would take 120+ years to iterate through all of them. You could probably rotate the nonce periodically, making it effectively worthless to pre-compute any table. But this gets complicated fast.
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4. kadoba+Pp[view] [source] 2021-06-06 02:35:15
>>xvecto+Ra
You could try to do a more difficult hash or something (bcrypt maybe?) but I don't know if it's a very good idea. I think you'd spike your latency, open yourself to DoS attacks or only minorly inconvenience anyone reversing the hashes, or some combination of those.
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5. xxs+iV[view] [source] 2021-06-06 10:51:01
>>kadoba+Pp
>(bcrypt maybe?) but I don't know if it's a very good idea

b/scrypt and all other password grade hashes are slow on purpose but they are slow per each use. Imagine the processing takes 0.1s (which is on the low side of hardness) per each request - you just killed all your servers w/o any designated DoS. If you abandon the nonce and use the same salt multiple times (so the computation is amortized), it'd take a replicated cache of IP->hash and even then it still doesn't accomplish much...

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