zlacker

>>chwtut+(OP)
IMO: trust-based systems only work if they carry risk. Your own score should be linked to the people you "vouch for" or "denounce".

This is similar to real life: if you vouch for someone (in business for example), and they scam them, your own reputation suffers. So vouching carries risk. Similarly, if you going around someone is unreliable, but people find out they actually aren't, your reputation also suffers. If vouching or denouncing become free, it will become too easy to weaponize.

Then again, if this is the case, why would you risk your own reputation to vouch for anyone anyway.

>>stepha+5b
Think Epstein but in code. Everyone would vouch for him as he’s hyper connected. So he’d get a free pass all the way. Until all blows in our faces and all that vouched for him now gets flagged. The main issue is that can take 10-20 years for it to blow up.

Then you have introverts that can be good but have no connections and won’t be able to get in.

So you’re kind of selecting for connected and good people.

>>skepti+Rr
Fair (and you’re basically describing the xz hack; vouching is done for online identities and not the people behind them).

Even with that risk I think a reputation based WoT is preferable to most alternatives. Put another way: in the current Wild West, there’s no way to identify, or track, or impose opportunity costs on transacting with (committing or using commits by) “Epstein but in code”.