zlacker

>>haramb+(OP)
Gosh there's a lot of corollary evidence pointing to his guilt but this is likely going to become more and more common and force the use of a lot more technical forensic resources.

Finding an original copy on a go-pro would likely be pretty compelling evidence but this (and the more scary politically centered questions like this) are why I wish we had a way to build a durable chain of custody into these technologies. It is infeasible from everything I've seen but it would be a big win for society.

>>munk-a+K5
Put private key into every digital camera and hash/sign every frame. That private key is accompanied with manufacturer signature and can't be easily extracted. Mark all unsigned media as suspicious.

>>vbezhe+m6
"can't easily be extracted" = "the number of people who can extract it is small but still non-zero"

And those people now have the power to put you in jail, by putting your camera's signature on illegal content.

You've also just made journalism 3 notches harder. Like documenting atrocities in, say, North Korea. Or for whistleblowers in your home steel mill run by a corporate slavedriver.

Oh. Also. Why are you choosing the camera side to put this on? Why not the AI side? Require watermarks and signatures for anything created in such a way…

…of course that has its own set of intractable problems.

>>eqvino+F7
Ideally, the keys would be per-manufacturer, like HDCP or (DVD-)CSS. Personally I don't think I'd love the idea of any kind of attestation like this, but if TPTB did implement it, I'd prefer a key per-manufacturer rather than each unit having its own unique signing key. We do have precedent, in the form of printer tracking dots, which were kept 'secret' from the public for 20 years. [0]

0: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Printer_tracking_dots