zlacker

>>haramb+(OP)
Gosh there's a lot of corollary evidence pointing to his guilt but this is likely going to become more and more common and force the use of a lot more technical forensic resources.

Finding an original copy on a go-pro would likely be pretty compelling evidence but this (and the more scary politically centered questions like this) are why I wish we had a way to build a durable chain of custody into these technologies. It is infeasible from everything I've seen but it would be a big win for society.

>>munk-a+K5
Put private key into every digital camera and hash/sign every frame. That private key is accompanied with manufacturer signature and can't be easily extracted. Mark all unsigned media as suspicious.

>>vbezhe+m6
"and can't be easily extracted" is doing a lot of work there. People are very good at reverse-engineering. There would soon be a black market for 'clean' private keys that could be used to sign any video you want.

>>widder+o7
There would also be a requirement for all playback to actually properly check the private keys and for all the parties involved in the process to be acting in good faith. Not only would you have a black market for individuals to scalp clean keys but you'd likely have nation states with interests putting pressure on local manufacturers to give them backdoors.

We'd probably hit a lot of that with SSL if it wasn't so unimportant from a political perspective[1]... but if the thing we were trying to secure is going to boost or damage some prominent politician directly then the level of pressure is going to be on a whole different scale.

1. And we might still have that corruption of SSL when it comes to targeted phishing attacks.