zlacker

>>secure+(OP)
The sandbox-or-not debate is important but it's only half the picture. Even a perfectly sandboxed agent can still generate code with vulnerabilities that get deployed to production - SQL injection, path traversal, hardcoded secrets, overly permissive package imports.

The execution sandbox stops the agent from breaking out during development, but the real risk is what gets shipped downstream. Seeing more tools now that scan the generated code itself, not just contain the execution environment.

>>the_ha+k7b
Precisely! There's a fundamental tension: 1. Agents need to interact with the outside world to be useful 2. Interacting with the outside world is dangerous

Sandboxes provide a "default-deny policy" which is the right starting point. But, current tools lack the right primitives to make fine grained data-access and data policy a reality.

Object-capabilities provide the primitive for fine-grained access. IFC (information flow control) for dataflow.

>>ryanra+fGb
I agree. However, how to define these permissions when agent behavior is undefined?