zlacker

>>johnsp+(OP)
> In Deno Sandbox, secrets never enter the environment. Code sees only a placeholder

> The real key materializes only when the sandbox makes an outbound request to an approved host. If prompt-injected code tries to exfiltrate that placeholder to evil.com? Useless.

That seems clever.

>>emschw+Hb
Reminds me a little of Fly's Tokenizer - https://github.com/superfly/tokenizer

It's a little HTTP proxy that your application can route requests through, and the proxy is what handles adding the API keys or whatnot to the request to the service, rather than your application, something like this for example:

Application -> tokenizer -> Stripe

The secrets for the third party service should in theory then be safe should there be some leak or compromise of the application since it doesn't know the actual secrets itself.

Cool idea!

>>motrm+Ud
It's exactly the tokenizer, but we shoplifted the idea too; it belongs to the world!

(The credential thing I'm actually proud of is non-exfiltratable machine-bound Macaroons).

Remember that the security promises of this scheme depend on tight control over not only what hosts you'll send requests to, but what parts of the requests themselves.

>>tptace+eg
How does this work with more complex authentication schemes, like AWS?

>>orf+jb1
AWS has a more powerful abstraction already, where you can condition permissions such that they are only granted when the request comes from a certain VPC or IP address (i.e. VPN exit). Malware thus exfiltrated real credentials, but they'll be worthless.

>>solati+rB2
I'm not prepared to say which abstraction is more powerful but I do think it's pretty funny to stack a non-exfiltratable credential up against AWS given how the IMDS works. IMDS was the motivation for machine-locked tokens for us.

>>tptace+cR3
There are two separate concerns here: who the credentials are associated with, and where the credentials are used. IMDS's original security flaw was that it only covered "who" the credentials were issued to (the VM) and not where they were used, but aforementioned IAM conditions now ensure that they are indeed used within the same VPC. If a separate proxy is setup to inject credentials, then while this may cover the "where" concern, care must still be taken on the "who" concern, i.e. to ensure that the proxy does not fall to confused deputy attacks arising from multiple sandboxed agents attempting to use the same proxy.

>>solati+H74
There are lots of concerns, not just two, but the point of machine-bound Macaroons is to address the IMDS problem.