zlacker

>>natebc+(OP)
The WinGUp updater compromise is a textbook example of why update mechanisms are such high-value targets. Attackers get code execution on machines that specifically trust the update channel.

What's concerning is the 6-month window. Supply chain attacks are difficult to detect because the malicious code runs with full user permissions from a "trusted" source. Most endpoint protection isn't designed to flag software from a legitimate publisher's update infrastructure.

For organizations, this argues for staged rollouts and network monitoring for unexpected outbound connections from common applications. For individuals, package managers with cryptographic verification at least add another barrier - though obviously not bulletproof either.

>>Soeren+Wc
The lack of a well-known, well-designed package manager for Windows has always been a problem. Too many programs, including FOSS programs, are downloaded from suspicious-looking websites with tons of ads, and every app updates itself in a different way.

The crappy installation and update channels are often tightly integrated with the vendors' monetization strategies, so there's a huge amount of inertia.

Microsoft Store could have changed this situation, had it been better designed and better received. Unfortunately, nobody seems to use it unless they have no other choice.

WinGet looks much better, but so far it's only for developers and power users.

>>kijin+Wz
> Microsoft Store could have changed this situation

Don't you need to create a Microsoft account to use it? That makes sense for a store where you buy apps with money, but not for a package manager for free software like Notepad++.

P.S. I'm waiting for the day you need a registered Ubuntu account to use their snap store :(