zlacker

>>natebc+(OP)
The WinGUp updater compromise is a textbook example of why update mechanisms are such high-value targets. Attackers get code execution on machines that specifically trust the update channel.

What's concerning is the 6-month window. Supply chain attacks are difficult to detect because the malicious code runs with full user permissions from a "trusted" source. Most endpoint protection isn't designed to flag software from a legitimate publisher's update infrastructure.

For organizations, this argues for staged rollouts and network monitoring for unexpected outbound connections from common applications. For individuals, package managers with cryptographic verification at least add another barrier - though obviously not bulletproof either.

>>Soeren+Wc
The lack of a well-known, well-designed package manager for Windows has always been a problem. Too many programs, including FOSS programs, are downloaded from suspicious-looking websites with tons of ads, and every app updates itself in a different way.

The crappy installation and update channels are often tightly integrated with the vendors' monetization strategies, so there's a huge amount of inertia.

Microsoft Store could have changed this situation, had it been better designed and better received. Unfortunately, nobody seems to use it unless they have no other choice.

WinGet looks much better, but so far it's only for developers and power users.

>>kijin+Wz
Do you really need the entire walled garden of the store? It's not impervious just harder to attack but due to it's scale and value it will be constantly attacked. Not a great trade.

What happened to just good old OS APIs? You could wrap the entire "secure update" process into a function call. Does Windows somehow not already have this?

>>themaf+dX
I'm sure updating can be done with OS APIs, though MS doesn't look like they're in any hurry to integrate even their own store with the Windows Update mechanism.

The problem is finding and installing new software. Without a well-known official repository, people end up downloading Windows apps from random websites filled with ads and five different "Download" buttons, bundled with everything from McAfee to Adobe Reader.

We should be asking how to enable adding external sources like Ubuntu PPAs (which can then be updated like the rest), not whether there should be an official repository to bootstrap the package manager in the first place. "Store" is just a typical name for such a repository, it's not mandatory.