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1. ashish+q9[view] [source] 2026-02-03 23:29:06
>>natebc+(OP)
I am running a lot of tools inside sandbox now for exactly this reason. The damage is confined to the directory I'm running that tool in.

There is no reason for a tool to implicitly access my mounted cloud drive directory and browser cookies data.

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2. troad+9b[view] [source] 2026-02-03 23:38:13
>>ashish+q9
MacOS has been getting a lot of flak recently for (correct) UI reasons, but I honestly feel like they're the closest to the money with granular app permissions.

Linux people are very resistant to this, but the future is going to be sandboxed iOS style apps. Not because OS vendors want to control what apps do, but because users do. If the FOSS community continues to ignore proper security sandboxing and distribution of end user applications, then it will just end up entirely centralised in one of the big tech companies, as it already is on iOS and macOS by Apple.

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3. black_+Ze[view] [source] 2026-02-03 23:57:31
>>troad+9b
I think we could get a lot further if we implement proper capability based security. Meaning that the authority to perform actions follows the objects around. I think that is how we get powerful tools and freedom, but still address the security issues and actually achieve the principle of least privilege.

For FreeBSD there is capsicum, but it seems a bit inflexible to me. Would love to see more experiments on Linux and the BSDs for this.

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4. Findec+cy[view] [source] 2026-02-04 02:01:16
>>black_+Ze
FreeBSD used to have an ELF target called "CloudABI" which used Capsicum by default. Parameters to a CloudABI program were passed in a YAML file to a launcher that acquired what was in practice the program's "entitlements"/"app permissions" as capabilities that it passed to the program when it started.

I had been thinking of a way to avoid the CloudABI launcher. The entitlements would instead be in the binary object file, and only reference command-line parameters and system paths. I have also thought of an elaborate scheme with local code signing to verify that only user/admin-approved entitlements get lifted to capabilities.

However, CloudABI got discontinued in favour of WebAssembly (and I got side-tracked...)

Redox is also moving towards having capabilities mapped to fd's, somewhat like Capsicum. Their recent presentation at FOSDEM: https://fosdem.org/2026/schedule/event/KSK9RB-capability-bas...

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