zlacker

>>takira+(OP)
The primary exfiltration vector for LLMs is making network requests via images with sensitive data as parameters.

As Claude Code increasingly uses browser tools, we may need to move away from .env files to something encrypted, kind of like rails credentials, but without the secret key in the .env

>>0xferr+TI
So you are going to take the untrusted tool that kept leaking your secrets, keep the secrets away from it but still use it to code the thing that uses the secrets? Are you actually reviewing the code it produces? In 99% of cases that's a "no" or a soft "sometimes".

>>SahAss+iQ
That's exactly what one does with their employees when one deploys "credential vaults", so?

>>TeMPOr+Ln4
Employees are under contract and are screened for basic competence. LLMs aren't and can't be.

>>SahAss+Eo4
> Employees are under contract and are screened for basic competence. LLMs aren't

So perhaps they should be.

> and can't be.

Ah but they must, because there's not much else you can do.

You can't secure LLMs like they were just regular, narrow-purpose software, because they aren't. They're by nature more like little people on a chip (this is an explicit design goal) - and need to be treated accordingly.

>>TeMPOr+So4
> So perhaps they should be.

Unless both the legalities and technology radically change they will not be. And the companies building them will not take on the burden since the technology has proved to be so unpredictable (partially by design) and unsafe.

> designed to be more like little people on a chip - and need to be treated accordingly

Deeply unpredictable and unsafe people on a chip, so not the sort that I generally want to trust secrets with.

I don't think it's that complex, you can have secure systems or you can have current gen LLMs. You can't have both in the same place.